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Does the Tail Wag the Dog?
The Eect of Credit Default Swaps on Credit Risk
ABSTRACT
Credit default swaps (CDS) are derivative contracts that are widely used as tools
for credit risk management. However, in recent years, concerns have been raised about
whether CDS trading itself aects the credit risk of the reference entities. We use a
unique, comprehensive sample covering CDS trading of 901 North American corporate
issuers, between June 1997 and April 2009, to address this question. We nd that the
probability of both a credit rating downgrade and bankruptcy increase, with large eco-
nomic magnitudes, after the inception of CDS trading. This nding is robust to control-
ling for the endogeneity of CDS trading. Beyond the CDS introduction eect, we show
that rms with relatively larger amounts of CDS contracts outstanding, and those with
relatively more \no restructuring" contracts than other types of CDS contracts covering
restructuring, are more adversely aected by CDS trading. Moreover, the number of
creditors increases after CDS trading begins, exacerbating creditor coordination failure
for the resolution of nancial distress.
Keywords: Credit default swaps, credit risk, bankruptcy, empty creditor
I. Introduction
Credit default swaps (CDS) are insurance-type contracts that oer buyers protection against
default by a debtor. The CDS market grew by leaps and bounds from $180 billion in 1997 to
$62 trillion in 2007, measured by notional amount outstanding.1 CDS are arguably the most
controversial nancial innovation of the past two decades, extolled by some and disparaged by
others.2 CDS played a prominent role in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the collapse of
AIG, and the sovereign debt crisis of Greece. Although the CDS market shrank considerably
following the global nancial crisis, it nevertheless stood at about $29 trillion by December
2011. In spite of misgivings about the role of CDS in potentially destabilizing markets, their
role as indicators of credit quality has, in fact, expanded. CDS spreads are widely quoted by
practitioners and regulators for the assessment of credit risks, for both individual corporate
debtors and the overall sovereign risk of a country. Meanwhile, on-shore CDS trading was
launched in China and India after the credit crisis. In contrast to the intense public debate,
theoretical arguments and policy initiatives, empirical evidence on the real eects of CDS
trading on corporations referenced by CDS contracts is sparse. In this paper, we attempt to
ll this gap in the literature, using a comprehensive dataset to empirically examine the eects
of CDS on the credit risk of the reference rms.
Derivatives are often assumed to be redundant securities in pricing and hedging models
and hence have no eect, adverse or benign, on the price of the underlying asset or the integrity
of markets. In structural models of credit risk along the lines of Merton (1974), default risk
is driven principally by leverage and asset volatility. In the spirit of that framework, CDS
are regarded as \side-bets" on the value of the rm and hence do not have an impact on the
credit risk associated with the individual claims issued by the rm. In particular, in such
models, CDS trading does not aect the probability of bankruptcy or even the possibility of
a credit rating downgrade.
Many of the issues mentioned in the context of derivatives, in general, have also been raised
1Semiannual OTC Derivative Statistics, Bank for International Settlements (BIS). CDS market statistics
are also regularly published by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and the British
Banker's Association (BBA).
2Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that \these increasingly complex nancial
instruments have contributed, especially over the recent stressful period, to the development of a far more
exible, ecient, and hence resilient nancial system than existed just a quarter-century ago." (See \Economic
Flexibility", Alan Greespan, Speech given to Her Majesty's Treasury Enterprise Conference, London, January
26, 2004.) In striking contrast, Warren Buett, the much-acclaimed investor, weighed against derivatives, in
general, by describing them as \time bombs, for the parties that deal in them and the economic system" and
went on to conclude that \in my view, derivatives are nancial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers
that, while now latent, are potentially lethal." (See the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report for 2002.) In a
similar vein, George Soros, a legendary hedge fund manager, argued that \CDS are toxic instruments whose
use ought to be strictly regulated." (See \One Way to Stop Bear Raids", Wall Street Journal, March 24,
2009.)
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in the specic case of CDS regarding their eect on the underlying asset.3 Apart from common
concerns that apply to all derivatives, CDS contracts are somewhat dierent. CDS contracts
are traded over-the-counter, where price transparency and discovery are less clear-cut than
in the exchanges on which most equity derivatives are listed. Moreover, nancial institutions,
including the bank creditors of the reference entities, are major participants of the CDS
market. CDS typically have much longer maturities than most exchange-traded derivatives,
allowing the traders more exibility in adjusting their positions. If creditors selectively trade
CDS linked to their borrowers, CDS positions can change the creditor-borrower relationship
and play an important role in determining the borrower credit risk that determines CDS
payos. On the one hand, CDS allow creditors to hedge their credit risk; therefore they
may increase the supply of credit to the underlying rm. Such improved access to capital
may increase borrowers' nancial exibility and resilience to nancial distress.4 On the other
hand, lenders may not be as vigilant in monitoring the borrowers once their credit exposures
are hedged. Consequently, rms, in turn, may take on more risky projects. Furthermore,
CDS-protected creditors are likely tougher during debt renegotiations, once the borrowers
are in nancial distress, by refusing debt workouts and making borrowers more vulnerable to
bankruptcy.
We empirically examine the eects of CDS trading on the credit risk of reference entities
using a comprehensive dataset dating back to the broad inception of the CDS market for
corporate names in 1997. It should be emphasized that it is dicult to obtain accurate
data on CDS transactions from a single source, since CDS trading does not take place on
centralized exchanges. Indeed, the central clearing of CDS is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Our identication of CDS inception and transactions relies, of necessity, on multiple data
sources including GFI Inc., the largest global interdealer broker with the most extensive
records of CDS trades and quotes, CreditTrade, a major intermediary especially in the early
stages of the CDS market, and Markit, a data disseminator and vendor that provides daily
valuations based on quotes from major sell-side institutions. Our combined dataset covers
901 North American rms with a CDS trading history during the period from 1997 to 2009.
The list of bankruptcies for North American rms is comprehensively constructed from major
data sources such as New Generation Research, the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Database,
the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Bankruptcy List, the Fixed Income Securities Database
(FISD), and Moody's Annual Reports on Bankruptcy and Recovery. Over the same time
3At a general level, there is evidence from the equity market that derivatives trading can aect the pricing
of the underlying asset. See, for example, an early survey by Damodaran and Subrahmanyam (1992), and
Sorescu (2000), for examples of such studies.
4Indeed, this argument has been cited as the motivation for the invention of CDS by JPMorgan, which
lent to Exxon Mobil in 1994 in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill lawsuit. In a pioneering trans-
action, JPMorgan hedged part of its credit exposure using a CDS transaction with the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). See Tett (2009).
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period, our overall sample of rms covers 3,863 rating downgrades from Standard & Poor's
and 1,628 bankruptcy lings.
Our rst nding from the combined dataset is that, controlling for fundamental credit
risk determinants suggested by structural models, the likelihood of a rating downgrade and
the likelihood of the bankruptcy of the reference rms both increase after CDS start trad-
ing. The increase in credit risk after CDS trading begins is both statistically signicant and
economically meaningful. For our sample of CDS rms, credit ratings decline by about half
a notch, on average, in the two years after the inception of CDS trading. In a similar vein,
the probability of bankruptcy more than doubles (from 0.14% to 0.47%) once the CDS start
trading on a rm.
The selection of rms for CDS trading and the endogeneity of the timing of CDS inception
need to be addressed in order to make a causal inference about the eect of CDS trading.
CDS rms and non-CDS rms are quite dierent in terms of their key characteristics. There
could be unobserved omitted variables that drive both the selection of rms for CDS trading
and changes in bankruptcy risk. Also, the timing of CDS inception can be endogenous as
CDS trading is more likely to be initiated when market participants anticipate the future
deterioration in the credit quality of the reference rm. We address these two concerns in
several ways besides the basic xed eects controls. Specically, we construct a model to
predict CDS trading for individual rms. This model allows us to measure the treatment
eect of CDS inception using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, run a propensity score
matching analysis for rms with and without CDS trading, and conduct a dierence-in-
dierence estimation. We nd two IVs for CDS trading. The rst IV is the foreign exchange
(FX) hedging position of lenders and bond underwriters. Lenders with a larger FX hedging
position are more likely, in general, to trade the CDS of their borrowers. The second is the
lenders' Tier One capital ratio. Banks with lower capital ratios have a greater need to hedge
the credit risk of their borrowers via CDS. It seems valid to exclude both IVs from the credit
risk predictions of rms since they only aect borrower credit risk via CDS market activities.
We also show that both IVs are signicant determinants of CDS trading and that they are
not weak instruments. Furthermore, the Sargan over-identication tests fail to reject the
hypothesis that both IVs are exogenous. The positive relationship between CDS trading and
bankruptcy risk remains signicant, even after controlling for the selection and endogeneity
of CDS trading.
The eect of CDS trading on credit risk goes beyond the simple binary categorization of
rms' CDS status. It is conceivable that CDS will be more inuential when the market is
more liquid and when more contracts are outstanding. Indeed, we nd that the likelihood of
bankruptcy increases with the number of live CDS contracts outstanding. Therefore, the eect
of CDS works in both directions: Bankruptcy risk increases as CDS positions gather force
3
and decreases when the amount of CDS trading is reduced. These ndings further strengthen
the evidence that the increase in credit risk after CDS trading begins is not completely due
to selection and endogeneity.
After establishing our primary nding that the reference rms' credit risk increases after
CDS trading begins, we investigate potential mechanisms for channeling the eect of CDS
trading on credit risk. CDS can aect rm fundamentals such as the leverage and the interest
burden. The credit risk of a rm clearly increases as it becomes more leveraged. Indeed,
we nd that rm leverage increases signicantly after CDS trading begins. The increase in
leverage can be due to either enlarged credit supply or reduced debt nancing restrictions
imposed by lenders after CDS trading has begun.5 Therefore, we control for leverage (both
before and after CDS trading) in our regression analysis in order to isolate the leverage channel
from other possibilities. The credit risk of a rm can also increase if it is more vulnerable
in nancial distress. One source of vulnerability arises from the creditor's unwillingness to
work out troubled debt. Another source is the potential failure of coordination among the
distressed rm's creditors.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that CDS positions can play an important role in the process
of distress resolution. To cite one such instance, CIT Group attempted to work out its debt
from late 2008 to mid-2009. In the event, however, some creditors with CDS protection
rejected the rm's exchange oer.6 CIT Group eventually led for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
on November 1, 2009. Hu and Black (2008) term such CDS-protected debt-holders \empty
creditors", meaning that they have all the same legal rights as creditors, but do not have
positive risk exposure to borrower default; hence, their nancial interests are not aligned with
those of other creditors who do not enjoy such protection.7
The empty creditor problem is formally modeled by Bolton and Oehmke (2011).8 Their
model predicts that, under mild assumptions, lenders will choose to become empty creditors
by buying CDS protection. Consequently, they will be tougher in debt renegotiation when
the rm is under stress. Empty creditors are even willing to push the rm into bankruptcy
if their total payos including CDS payments would be larger in that event. In their model,
CDS sellers anticipate this empty creditor problem and price it into the CDS premium, but
5Saretto and Tookes (2012) focus on the eect of CDS trading on leverage and conrm the hypothesis of
increased leverage.
6See \Goldman Purchase Puts CDS in Focus", Financial Times, October 4, 2009, and \Goldman Sachs
May Reap $1 Billion in CIT Bankruptcy", Bloomberg, October 5, 2009.
7The use of equity derivatives such as options or swaps in the context of equities creates the analogous
issue of \empty voters" who enjoy voting rights in the rm, but without any nancial risk, by breaking the
link between cash ow rights and control rights.
8Table 1 of Bolton and Oehmke (2011) lists other cases of suspected empty creditors, demonstrating that
the CIT example is not that unique. Other studies such as Due (2007), Stulz (2010), and Jarrow (2011)
also oer relevant discussions on creditor incentives.
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they cannot directly intervene in the debt renegotiation process (unless they buy bonds or
loans so as to become creditors).
Our data do not include trader identities; therefore, we cannot directly observe the pres-
ence and extent of empty creditors; neither are we aware of other data sources that would
allow direct detection of empty creditors. In an indirect test, we nd that rm bankruptcy
risk is positively related to the total CDS amount divided by total debt. We further construct
a more eective test of tough creditor implications. Our combined dataset contains contract
terms that allow us to test a unique prediction of the empty creditor model. Specically,
we know for each CDS contract whether restructuring is covered as a credit event or not.
Buyers of \no restructuring" CDS contracts will be paid only if the reference rm les for
bankruptcy or there is a failure to pay. However, buyers of other types of CDS contracts
that include restructuring as a credit event will be compensated even when the debt of the
reference rm is restructured. Clearly, creditors with \no restructuring" CDS protection will
have a stronger incentive to force bankruptcy than buyers of other CDS contracts without
this restrictive clause. Indeed, we nd that the eects of CDS trading are stronger when a
larger fraction of the CDS contracts contain the \no restructuring" credit event clause. This
result also provides evidence of the causal eects of CDS trading, particularly since there is
no signicant eect from other types of CDS contracts and, even more so, since this measure
does not directly rely on the selection of rms for CDS trading.
The availability of CDS contracts may render more banks willing to lend, due to the
possibility of risk mitigation and enhanced bargaining power via CDS contracts. However,
such an expanded lender base can also hinder debt workouts. The greater the number of
lenders, the more likely that some lenders will choose to become empty creditors, and the
more severe will be the problems of coordination in a stressed situation, when a workout may
be necessary. Therefore, CDS trading may aect lending relationships, and in particular the
number of lenders. Indeed, we nd that more creditors lend to the rms after reference CDS
become available. Consistent with prior ndings, we also nd that bankruptcy risk increases
with the number of lenders due to creditor coordination failure, thus providing another channel
for the adverse eect of CDS trading on bankruptcy risk.
In sum, rather than being an instrument providing insurance against borrower default,
CDS trading can increase the likelihood of borrower default (\the tail wags the dog"). Our
main contribution is documenting a real eect of the trading of CDS on the survival probabil-
ities of rms. We are among the rst to formally test and support the empty creditor model of
Bolton and Oehmke (2011). Our study complements Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Saretto
and Tookes (2012), who nd that the cost of debt of risky rms, and their leverage, increase
after CDS trading has started.
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Our ndings have implications for investors in credit markets as well as rms. These
entities need to consider the impact of CDS trading on the likelihood of bankruptcy in their
pricing of corporate debt. Financial regulators and policy makers need to take the increase
in credit risk following CDS trading into account in their regulatory actions. In particular,
banking regulators need to incorporate this eect in their risk weighting formulae, while
securities regulators may require further disclosures of CDS positions, so that investors are
made aware of the extent of the potential impact of CDS trading on credit risk.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II develops testable hypothe-
ses in relation to the literature. The construction of our dataset is described in Section III.
Section IV presents our empirical results for the eect of CDS trading along with a detailed
examination of the endogeneity concerns and the mechanisms for the eect. Section V con-
cludes.
II. Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses
CDS were originally invented to help banks to transfer credit risk, maintain relationships with
borrowers, and expand their business. The availability of CDS has indeed aorded banks the
exibility and opportunity to manage their credit risk. Over time, other agents including
hedge funds, mutual funds and other investors have become active in the CDS market. We
place our research in the context of the literature on the CDS market, with particular reference
to studies that address issues relating to the relationship between rms and their creditors.9
Several recent theoretical studies model the role of CDS in debt nancing. Bolton and
Oehmke (2011) argue that credit supply can increase because creditors will be tougher and
have more bargaining power in debt renegotiation when they use CDS to protect their ex-
posure, thereby reducing borrowers' incentives for strategic default. On the other hand, Che
and Sethi (2012) conjecture that CDS can crowd out lending as creditors can sell CDS instead
of making loans or buying bonds, eectively reducing credit supply and increasing the cost
of debt. Campello and Matta (2012) point out that the eect of CDS depends on macroeco-
nomic conditions. The empirical evidence relating to the eect of CDS on the cost and supply
of debt is mixed. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) nd that, after CDS introduction, the cost of
debt increases for low-quality rms and decreases for high-quality rms. While Hirtle (2009)
nds no signicant increase in bank credit supply after the initiation of CDS trading, Saretto
9There is a vast literature on other aspects of CDS trading. Longsta, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Stanton
and Wallace (2011), and Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam and Mahanti (2012) discuss the pricing of CDS. Apart
from individual rms in the economy, CDS trading may also have an eect on the aggregate economy. For
instance, Duee and Zhou (2001) and Allen and Carletti (2006) show that CDS trading may hurt nancial
stability when rms are interconnected. Arping (2004) and Morrison (2005) argue that CDS can reduce the
lender-borrower combined welfare.
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and Tookes (2012) nd that the reference rm's leverage increases.
There are potentially both positive and negative inuences of CDS trading on the credit
risk of reference entities. On the one hand, if the leverage of a rm increases after CDS trading
has begun, it follows that its bankruptcy risk also increases correspondingly. Moreover, as we
illustrate in Appendix A, the lenders' willingness to restructure the rm's debt in the event of
nancial distress is aected by their respective CDS positions. Some CDS-protected lenders
may prefer the bankruptcy of borrowers, if the payos from their CDS positions are high
enough. Although there are other reasons why lenders may be unwilling to restructure the
debt of a rm in nancial distress (for example, they may believe that the borrower could
eventually go bankrupt even after a debt restructuring), their CDS positions will be a factor
in their decision. On the other hand, issuers could benet from CDS trading on their names.
Allen and Carletti (2006) show that, under certain conditions, CDS improve risk sharing
and are good for both borrowers and lenders. Parlour and Winton (2012) construct a model
showing that CDS can help improve lending eciency for high-quality borrowers. Norden,
Silva-Buston, and Wagner (2012) show that lenders with more CDS activities oer lower loan
rates and help their borrowers during periods of nancial crisis. It follows that, if CDS are
benecial to the lenders, then some of the benets may be passed on to or shared with the
borrowers, thus making rms safer. If the risks outweigh the benets of nancial exibility,
then we expect rms to be riskier after CDS trading:
Hypothesis 1 (Baseline) The credit risk of a rm and, in particular, its risk of bankruptcy
increase after the introduction of trading on CDS contracts referencing its default.
One could alternatively examine the related hypothesis that CDS trading reduces the success
rate of restructuring for distressed rms. This latter question has been addressed in three
complementary studies, albeit with smaller samples, by Bedendo, Cathcart, and El-Jahel
(2012), Danis (2012) and Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2012), with conicting conclusions.
While Danis (2012) nds signicant impact of CDS trading on restructuring, Bedendo, Cath-
cart, and El-Jahel (2012) and Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2012) fail to nd such eects. Our
analysis applies to the full sample of rms, both healthy and distressed. Bankruptcy may be
a better testing framework than restructuring as bankruptcy events are more easily observed
than restructuring events. Moreover, dening distressed rms in the context of restructuring
is a subjective assessment, which poses challenges for the researcher (and may explain the
mixed evidence from above-mentioned studies). Therefore, we focus on bankruptcy lings in
our analysis here.
The eect of CDS trading can vary considerably even among CDS rms. Indeed, Minton,
Stulz, and Williamson (2009) nd that banks' use of CDS depends on the market liquidity
of the particular instrument. The larger is the holding of CDS relative to debt outstanding,
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the greater is the benet to CDS buyers, and hence, their incentive to tilt the rm towards
bankruptcy. Therefore, we quantify the CDS eect based on the amount of CDS trading in
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (CDS Exposure) The increase in the bankruptcy risk of a rm after the
introduction of trading in CDS contracts referencing its default is larger for a rm with a
greater number of CDS contracts outstanding.
Another distinctive feature of our study is that we test for the quantitative implications of
CDS trading. Peristiani and Savino (2011) document that higher bankruptcy risk is signicant
in the presence of CDS during 2008, but insignicant overall in their sample. Our study uses a
comprehensive database and rigorous econometric procedures to provide more powerful tests
than the binary CDS introduction events.
We next address the issue of the mechanisms by which CDS trading aects bankruptcy
risk, with particular emphasis on the incentives of tough creditors.10 Empty creditors do not
completely determine the fate of the reference entities. In some cases, the reference rms
survive without any credit events, or with straightforward debt rollover, if other creditors
support the borrower and outweigh the inuence of empty creditors. In such cases, empty
creditors will lose the additional premium they paid to the CDS sellers without any con-
comitant benets. However, if credit events do occur, empty creditors and other CDS buyers
will likely make prots. (Thompson (2010) shows that the insurance buyer will also need
to worry about whether the seller can honor its commitment.) Whether the overall eect of
CDS trading is signicant or not depends on the incentives of the marginal creditors, and will
be borne out in the data. If we can make the assumption that the presence of CDS implies
a higher probability of empty creditors than there are for non-CDS rms, then our primary
hypothesis will also answer this question. Moreover, we take advantage of information on the
amount of CDS relative to debt outstanding and the presence of the restructuring clause in
the CDS contracts:
Hypothesis 3 (Tough Creditors) The increase in the bankruptcy risk of a rm after the
introduction of trading in CDS contracts on it is larger if (a) there is a greater notional amount
of CDS contracts relative to debt outstanding (\over-insurance"), and (b) \no restructuring"
(NR) contracts account for a larger proportion of all CDS contracts referencing its default.
The third hypothesis suggests a unique test of the empty creditor mechanism by using a special
feature of the CDS contracts. If CDS contracts cover restructuring as a credit event, then
10One natural related question is: Are creditors tougher under CDS trading? The recent decline in the
absolute priority deviation during bankruptcy resolution documented by Bharath, Panchapagesan, andWerner
(2010) is consistent with tougher creditors and coincides with the development of the CDS market. However,
this issue merits more detailed investigation.
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creditors will be compensated, whether the distressed rm restructures or declares bankruptcy.
However, if restructuring is not covered in the restructuring clause, the default event may be
triggered, but the empty creditor will only get compensated if there is a failure to pay or the
rm les for bankruptcy. Therefore, we hypothesize that the empty creditor mechanism is
even more eective for NR CDS. We note that Bolton and Oehmke (2011) endogenize the
pricing of CDS contracts so that the CDS seller takes this \empty creditor" incentive into
account.
The hypothesis above emphasizes the ex post eect (after the loan and CDS positions
are given) of CDS due to lenders that are tougher in debt renegotiation, although not every
creditor would want to become an empty creditor. Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli (2011)
show that the lead bank suers reputation damage from borrower bankruptcies. From an
ex ante perspective, lenders could be strategic in their use of CDS and lending decisions.
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) show that lenders are more willing to lend when CDS permit
them the possibility of risk mitigation. It follows that more banks are willing to lend to a
rm when CDS are available.11 Such an expansion in the lender base and the level of lending
has two consequences. First, the likelihood of empty creditors is higher when there are more
lenders. Second, the probability of bankruptcy is higher when there are more lenders due
to the potential for coordination failure. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) show that creditor
coordination failure increases the risk of bankruptcy. Brunner and Krahnen (2008) show that
distress workouts are less successful when there are more creditors. Therefore, we generate
our last hypothesis in two parts:
Hypothesis 4 (Lender Coordination) (a) The number of (bank) lenders increases after
the introduction of CDS trading. (b) Bankruptcy risk increases with the number of lenders.
III. Dataset on CDS Trading and Bankruptcy
We use actual transaction records to identify rms with CDS contracts written on them,
and in particular, the date when CDS trading began for each rm and the type of contract
traded. Unlike voluntary dealer quotes that are non-binding and may be based on hypothetical
contract specications, transaction data contain multi-dimensional information on the actual
CDS contracts, including price, volume and settlement terms. Our CDS transactions data
are obtained from two separate sources: CreditTrade and GFI Group. CreditTrade was the
11Borrowers may also want to broaden their lender base if they anticipate that some lenders could take
advantage of their respective CDS positions. Acharya and Johnson (2007) suggest that bank lenders engage
in insider trading in the CDS market. Hale and Santos (2009) show that, if banks exploit their information
advantage, rms respond by expanding their borrowing base to include lenders in the public bond market or
by adding more bank lenders.
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main data source for CDS transactions during the initial phase of the CDS market, before
GFI Group took over as the market leader.12 Combining data from these two sources allows
us to assemble a comprehensive history of North American corporate CDS trading activities.
Our CreditTrade data cover the period from June 1997 to March 2006, while our GFI data
cover the period from January 2002 to April 2009. Both datasets contain complete information
on intra-day quotes and trades such as the type of contract, the time of the transaction, order
type, and the CDS price. Since CDS contracts are traded over-the-counter, unlike stocks or
equity options, which are mostly traded on exchanges, the rst trading date for each rm's
CDS is hard to pinpoint with a time stamp. However, because we have overlapping samples
from these two data sources between January 2002 and March 2006, we are able to cross-check
the two records to conrm the reliability of our identication of the rst CDS trading date.
In the event, the dates of rst appearance of a particular CDS in the two data sources are
mostly within a couple of months of each other. To ensure greater accuracy, we also cross-
check trading-based CDS data with the Markit CDS database, a commonly used CDS dealer
quote database, and conrm our identication of rms for which CDS are traded and the
date of inception of trading.13 It should be stressed that any remaining noise in identifying
the precise introduction date of a particular CDS should bias us against nding signicant
empirical results regarding the consequent eects on credit risk.
There are two important advantages of using the complete set of transaction data in our
empirical analysis of non-sovereign North American corporate CDS. First, our sample starts in
1997, which is generally acknowledged to be the year of inception of the broad CDS market.14
Therefore, our identied rst CDS trading dates will not be contaminated by censoring of the
data series. Second, our CDS transaction data include the complete contractual terms, such
as the specication of the credit event, maturity, and security terms, at the contract level.
Aggregate position or quote data obtained from broker-dealers or, more recently, clearing
houses or data aggregators, would generally not include such detailed information. The credit
event specication allows us to investigate the eect of restructuring clauses. The maturity
information at the contract level allows us to calculate the amount of the outstanding CDS
positions at each point in time. Our sample of CDS introductions ends in April 2009 for an
important institutional reason: The market practice in CDS changed signicantly in April
2009 due to the \Big Bang" implemented by ISDA, including for example the removal of
restructuring as a standard credit event. In addition, we need an observation window of three
12Previous studies have used the same data sources. For example, Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Blanco,
Brennan, and Marsh (2005) utilize CreditTrade data. Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2011) use
CDS data from GFI. GFI ranked rst in the Risk Magazine CDS broker ranking from 2006-2010. (CreditTrade
was acquired in 2007 by Creditex, which merged with the CME in 2008.)
13Markit provides end-of-day \average" indicative quotes from contributing sell-side dealers, using a pro-
prietary algorithm. In contrast, both CreditTrade and GFI report trades as well as binding quotes.
14See Tett (2009) for a historical account.
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years after the introduction of CDS trading to capture its potential eects in our empirical
analysis.
Based on our merged dataset, there are 901 North American rms that have CDS initiated
on them at some point during the 1997-2009 sample period. The industry distribution of the
CDS rms in our sample is quite diverse.15 In our baseline analysis, we mainly utilize the
information about the rst day of CDS trading, and compare the changes in rm default risk
upon the onset of CDS trading. Later on, we also construct measures of the amount of CDS
outstanding and the fraction of CDS contracts with various restructuring clauses, based on
more detailed transaction information, to further understand how CDS trading aects credit
risk.
We assemble a comprehensive bankruptcy dataset by combining data from various sources
for North American corporations ling bankruptcies in U.S. courts. Our initial bankruptcy
sample is derived from New Generation Research's Public and Major Company Database,
available at www.BankruptcyData.com. This database includes information on public com-
panies ling for bankruptcy and also signicant bankruptcies of private rms. We further
validate and augment this initial sample with additional bankruptcy-ling data sources, in-
cluding the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Bankruptcy List, the Mergent Fixed Income Se-
curities Database (FISD), the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD), and
Moody's Annual Reports on Bankruptcy and Recovery. We use Dealscan Loan Pricing Cor-
poration (LPC) and FISD data to identify the lenders and underwriters to a rm. We obtain
data on foreign exchange hedging from the Federal Reserve call reports and bank capital ratio
data from the Compustat Bank le. Our rm data are drawn from the Compustat database.
Our sample covers bankruptcies of both large and small rms (many studies in the literature
only examine large rms).
We link the bankruptcy dataset with our CDS sample to identify the bankrupt rms that
had CDS trading prior to their bankruptcy lings. Table I presents the yearly summary
from 1997 to 2009 for all rms in the Compustat database: the number of bankrupt rms,
the number of rms on which CDS are traded, and the number of bankrupt rms with and
without CDS trading. The last row of Table I shows a total gure of 1,628 bankruptcy
lings during the 1997-2009 sample period. Many bankruptcies were led in the periods of
1999-2003 and 2008-2009, accounting for 1,214 of the 1,628 bankruptcy events during the
entire sample period (74.6%). The fourth and fth columns of the table report the number
of New CDS rms and the number of rms with Active CDS trading rms across the years,
respectively. More CDS contracts were introduced in the period 2000-2003 than in earlier or
15Most CDS rms in our sample are in the manufacturing (SIC 2, 3), transportation, communications, and
utilities (SIC 4), and nance, insurance, and real estate (SIC 6) sectors. In our empirical analysis, we control
for industry xed eects throughout.
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later periods. Among the 901 distinct CDS trading rms, 60 (6.7%) subsequently led for
bankruptcy protection. Bankruptcies among CDS rms represent a small fraction of the total
number of bankruptcies, since only relatively large rms, by asset size and debt outstanding,
have CDS trading. However, the bankruptcy rate of 6.7% for CDS rms is close to the 4-
year overall (or 11-year BBB-rated) cumulative default rate of U.S. rms (Standard & Poor's
(2012)).
IV. CDS Trading and Credit Risk: Empirical Results
This section presents our empirical ndings on the eect of CDS trading on a rm's credit
risk. We use several common measures of credit risk, including credit rating, probability of
bankruptcy, and expected default frequency, in our analysis. First, we report our baseline
results on the eects of the introduction of CDS trading. Second, we address the issue of
selection and endogeneity in the introduction of CDS trading. Third, we examine the eect
of CDS positions and contract terms, and investigate the mechanisms through which CDS
trading aects credit risk.
A. Rating Distributions Before and After CDS Introduction
A straightforward ordinal measure of credit risk is the credit rating that is widely used in
industry. We study the characteristics of CDS rms by rst analyzing their credit ratings
around the time of the introduction of CDS trading. If the issuer credit quality changes
after the introduction of CDS trading, the credit ratings may reect this CDS eect if rating
agencies perform reasonable credit analysis. Rating agencies incorporate information on both
bankruptcies and restructuring into rating decisions (Moody's (2009)). In addition, since
a credit rating downgrade is often the rst step towards bankruptcy and is an indicator of
an increase in bankruptcy risk, it may convey useful information about the probability of
bankruptcy.
We obtain the time series of Standard & Poor's (S&P) long-term issuer ratings from
Compustat and FISD. We then conduct an \event study" of the eect of the introduction
of CDS trading on credit ratings to gain a high-level understanding of the evidence. This
is a basic \within-rm" analysis, in which we compare the distribution of credit ratings in
the year right before CDS trading (year t   1), with the rating distribution two years after
CDS trading has begun (year t+2), for all rms with such contracts traded at some point in
our sample. These rating distributions, one year before and two years after the introduction
of CDS trading, are plotted in Figure 1. Our rst observation from Figure 1 is that A and
BBB ratings are the most common issuer ratings at the time when CDS trading is initiated.
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The vast majority of rms in our sample (92%) are rated by a credit rating agency at the
onset of CDS trading, with only a small proportion of rms being unrated at this juncture.
Compared to the general corporate rating distribution documented in Grin and Tang (2012),
our sample includes more BBB-rated rms relative to other investment grade (AAA, AA, A-
rated) rms, but also has fewer non-investment grade rms. Overall, rms in our sample are
of relatively good credit quality, as measured by credit ratings, at the time of CDS inception.
Figure 1 shows a discernible shift to lower credit quality after the introduction of CDS
trading. While the proportion of BBB-rated rms is about the same before and after CDS
trading begins, the proportion of AA-rated and A-rated rms decreases. At the same time, the
proportion of non-investment grade and unrated rms increases. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test statistic for the distributional dierence before and after CDS trading begins is signi-
cant at the 1% level, indicating that the credit rating distribution shifts to the right (lower
rating quality) after CDS trading begins. Specically, 54% of the rms maintain the same
ratings before and after the introduction of CDS trading, 37% of the rms experience rating
downgrading but only 9% of rms experience a rating improvement.16 These results provide
preliminary evidence that the credit quality of the reference entities deteriorates following the
inception of CDS trading.
B. Baseline Hazard Model Results on Downgrading and Bankruptcy
We next run multivariate tests to discern systematic statistical evidence, with appropriate
control variables, regarding the eect of the inception of CDS trading on credit risk. We
include rms with and without CDS traded in a panel data analysis, using monthly obser-
vations. We examine both credit rating downgrades and bankruptcy lings in our baseline
analysis.
There is a large literature on bankruptcy prediction dating back to the Z -score model of
Altman (1968). Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008)
discuss the merits of simple bankruptcy prediction models over their more complicated coun-
terparts and argue that the simple models perform quite well in predicting bankruptcy. In
keeping with this perspective, our approach is a proportional hazard model for bankruptcy
using panel data.17 Following Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Bharath and
Shumway (2008), we assume that the marginal probability of bankruptcy over the next period
16We also nd that, compared to non-CDS rms from the same industry and of similar size, there are 2.6%
more rating downgrades for CDS rms after CDS trading starts than for non-CDS rms at the same time.
17We also perform robustness checks on this model specication later on.
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follows a logistic distribution with parameters (; ) and time-varying covariates Xit 1:
Pr(Yit = 1jXit 1) = 1
1 + exp(   0Xit 1) ; (1)
where Yit is an indicator variable that equals one if rm i les for bankruptcy in period t,
and Xit 1 is a vector of explanatory variables observed at the end of the previous period. A
higher level of + 0Xit 1 represents a higher probability of bankruptcy. We follow Bharath
and Shumway (2008) to include ve fundamental determinants of default risk in Xit 1: the
logarithm of the rm's equity value (ln(E)), the rm's stock return in excess of market returns
over the past year (rit 1   rmt 1), the logarithm of the book value of the rm's debt (ln(F)),
the inverse of the rm's equity volatility (1=E), and the rm's protability measured by the
ratio of net income to total assets (NI/TA).18 We obtain rm accounting and nancial data
from CRSP and Compustat.
In addition to these ve fundamental variables we include two CDS variables, CDS Firm
and CDS Active, in the hazard model specications to estimate the impact of CDS trading
on bankruptcy risk, similarly to Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Saretto and Tookes (2012).
CDS Firm is a dummy variable that equals one for rms with CDS traded at any point during
our sample period. It is a rm xed characteristic and does not change over time. CDS Firm
is used to control for unobservable dierences between rms with and without CDS. CDS
Active is a dummy variable that equals one after the inception of the rm's CDS trading and
zero before CDS trading. CDS Active equals zero for non-CDS rms. Hence, the coecient
of interest is that of CDS Active, which captures the marginal impact of CDS introduction
on bankruptcy risk. Since the variables CDS Firm and CDS Active are positively correlated,
we report results both with and without the control of CDS Firm in our main analysis. We
also control for year and industry xed eects in the panel data analysis. We apply the same
specication to the analysis of the probability of a rating downgrade.
The proportional hazard model estimation results are presented in Table II. We follow
Shumway (2001) and correct the standard errors by the average number of observations per
cross-sectional unit. The rst column lists the independent variables in the model estima-
tion. The dependent variable for Specications 1 and 2 is the probability of a credit rating
downgrade in the observation month. The dependent variable for Specications 3 and 4 is
the probability of a bankruptcy ling in the observation month. The coecient estimate for
CDS Active is positive and signicant for all four specications. The eect of CDS Active
is not driven by fundamental dierences between CDS rms and non-CDS rms. Specica-
tions 2 and 4 show that the eect of CDS Active is signicant, even without controlling for
18Longsta, Giesecke, Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011) argue that factors suggested by structural models,
such as volatility and leverage, predict bankruptcy better than other rm variables.
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CDS Firm. The coecient estimates for the variable CDS Firm are statistically signicant
at the 1% level in both Specication 1 and Specication 3, but with opposite signs. That is,
compared to non-CDS rms, CDS rms are, in general, more likely to be downgraded but
less likely to go bankrupt. Such a diametrically opposite eect of CDS Firm is in contrast to
the consistently positive CDS Active eect, further attenuating the concern that the eect of
CDS Active is driven by multi-collinearity with CDS Firm.
The positive coecients of CDS Active in Specications 1 and 2 indicate that rms are
more likely to be downgraded after the inception of CDS trading. In both specications, the
eect of CDS trading is statistically signicant at the 1% level. The economic magnitude is
also large: Compared to the average downgrading probability of 0.58% in Specication 1, the
marginal eect of CDS trading on the probability of a downgrade is 0.39%. Specication 3
reports similar ndings for bankruptcy ling. Bankruptcy risk increases after CDS trading
has begun: Against an average rm bankruptcy probability of 0.14%, the marginal eect of
CDS trading on the bankruptcy probability is 0.33%. The odds ratio for CDS Active (the
likelihood of downgrading/bankruptcy after CDS trading divided by the likelihood of down-
grading/bankruptcy before CDS trading) for credit downgrades and bankruptcy predictions
are 1.925 and 10.73 respectively, indicating that credit events are much more likely after CDS
trading begins.
The eect of CDS Active is not driven by industry eects as we control for them throughout
our analysis. The estimation results for the other control variables in Table II are similar to
the ndings in prior studies. Larger rms and rms with higher stock returns are less likely to
be downgraded or to go bankrupt. Firms with higher leverage and greater equity volatility are
more likely to be downgraded or go bankrupt, all else being the same. As is to be expected,
protable rms are less likely to le for bankruptcy. Lastly, the pseudo-R2s, about 15% for
the downgrade regressions and 24% for the bankruptcy regressions, suggest that bankruptcy
lings are better explained by these explanatory variables than downgrades.
In sum, Table II of our baseline analysis shows consistent results that the credit quality of
reference rms declines after CDS trading begins. We also run a battery of robustness checks
on our baseline results for bankruptcy ling. First, we consider rm xed eects rather than
industry xed eects. We cannot include rm xed eects in our bankruptcy analysis as the
estimation does not converge due to its nonlinear specication. Therefore, we use distance-to-
default as the dependent variable. Such a specication allows us to include rm xed eects
(in this case we do not need to include the CDS Firm control). Moreover, we show that our
ndings are robust to alternative model specications, rating drift consideration and other
rm exits.19 Next we present the results of several alternative approaches, used to address
19The robustness checks are reported in the additional table le as an Internet Appendix. First, as shown
in Table A1 for distance-to-default, we control for xed eects and nd that the coecient of CDS Active
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the selection and endogeneity concerns in CDS trading.
C. Selection and Endogeneity in CDS Trading
The previous subsection shows a strong relation between CDS trading and the subsequent
increase in credit risk. However, the main challenges to inferring a causal relationship show-
ing that CDS trading leads to a deterioration in credit quality are the potential selection and
endogeneity in CDS trading. Selection eects would be a concern if CDS rms were funda-
mentally dierent from non-CDS rms, and such fundamental dierences were related to the
subsequent deterioration in credit quality. Nevertheless, the selection of rms into the CDS
sample may not be our biggest concern, since our focus is on the timing of CDS trading.20
Essentially, we are interested in the \within-rm" eect, where the timing of the introduc-
tion of CDS trading may be endogenous. It is conceivable that CDS traders anticipate the
deterioration in a rm's credit quality and initiate trading in its CDS contract. Therefore,
CDS Active, the variable measuring the eect of the timing of CDS introduction, is the main
endogenous variable of concern. We note that examining CDS Active for endogeneity also
takes CDS Firm (the selection of rms into the CDS sample) into account as CDS Active is
always zero for non-CDS rms. We use several standard econometric approaches to address
the endogeneity and selection issues, as suggested by Li and Prabhala (2007) and Roberts
and Whited (2012): IV estimation, the Heckman treatment eects model, propensity score
matching, and dierence-in-dierence estimation.
We need to rst have a good understanding of the determinants of CDS trading before
we can eectively apply the various econometric approaches to address the endogeneity and
selection issues. We aim to nd the most appropriate model for the selection of CDS trading
on rms, so that we can then adjust for this selectivity in our analysis of credit risk changes
after the start of CDS trading. We follow Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Saretto and Tookes
(2012), and other studies with similar endogeneity concerns for the specication of the CDS
trading selection model. Moreover, we take into account additional considerations in choosing
the explanatory variables for the CDS trading model, given that our focus is explicitly on
credit risk.
We employ two instrumental variables: FX hedging activities by banks and underwriters,
is still signicant. Second, we consider the bankruptcy prediction model used by Campbell, Hilscher, and
Szilagyi (2008) and report the results in Table A2, which shows similar results. Third, we take into account
the initial credit quality and the natural drift in credit quality, and show in Tables A3-A6 that our nding of
the CDS eect is robust to such considerations. Fourth, as shown in Table A7, the CDS eect is stronger for
non-investment grade rms. Fifth, Table A8 shows that our results are similar when we exclude rms that
exit the sample as a consequence of mergers and acquisitions.
20Recall from Figure 1 that CDS rms typically have investment grade ratings at the time of CDS in-
troduction. Therefore, the initiation of CDS trading is not necessarily attributable to poor initial credit
quality.
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Lender FX Usage, and the Tier One capital ratio of the lenders, Lender Tier 1 Capital.21 We
rst identify lenders and bond underwriters for our sample rms based on DealScan data (for
lenders) and FISD data (for bond underwriters). We then look at Federal Reserve call report
data for the FX derivatives positions for these lenders and bond underwriters. For each rm
in each quarter, Lender FX Usage is constructed as the average amount of FX derivatives
usage for hedging purposes relative to their total assets, across banks that have either served
as a lender or a bond underwriter over the previous ve years. To construct the instrument
Lender Tier 1 Capital, we further link the identications of the lenders and bond underwriters
with the Compustat Bank le containing lenders' Tier One capital ratio data. For each rm
in each quarter, the Lender Tier 1 Capital ratio is dened as the average of the Tier One
capital ratios across banks that have either served as lenders or bond underwriters for this
rm over the previous ve years. Besides these two instruments as explanatory variables for
CDS trading, we also include rm size: Larger rms naturally attract more attention from
CDS traders since the chance of hedging demand arising from any investor is greater for
larger rms. In addition, we include a set of rm characteristics such as sales, tangible assets,
working capital, cash holdings and capital expenditure. Furthermore, we include credit risk
variables such as leverage, protability, equity volatility, and the credit rating status of the
rm, for predicting the inception of CDS trading.
We use data from 1997 until the rst month of CDS trading for CDS rms, and all
observations for non-CDS rms, to predict the introduction of CDS trading for a rm. The
prediction is estimated using a probit model: the dependent variable is equal to one after the
rm starts CDS trading, and zero prior to that. The probit regression results are reported in
Table III. We conrm that larger rms are more likely to have CDS contracts trading on them.
CDS trading is more likely for rms with higher leverage but with investment grade ratings.
Unrated rms are less likely to have CDS trading. Firms with high protability, tangibility,
and large working capital are more likely to have CDS trading. Overall, it appears that rms
have relatively high credit quality and visibility (a stronger balance sheet and larger size) at
the time of CDS inception. Both our instrumental variables, Lender FX Usage and Lender
Tier 1 Capital, are signicant predictors of CDS trading, even after controlling for other
variables.
Table III shows that CDS trading can be reasonably explained by the chosen variables, with
pseudo-R2s of around 38.9% across the three model specications (Models 1 and 2 include one
IV at a time and Model 3 includes both IVs). In the following analysis, we will use these three
CDS trading prediction models to conduct our IV estimation, treatment eects, propensity
score matching, and dierence-in-dierence analyses, to re-examine the relationship between
CDS trading and bankruptcy risk. We focus on the probability of bankruptcy in the remaining
21Saretto and Tookes (2012) also use the the rst of these, Lender FX Usage.
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analysis to conserve space, although the results for the probability of a credit rating downgrade
point to the same conclusion, and are available upon request.
C.1. Instrumental Variable Estimation
We rst present our IV estimation results to address the selection and endogeneity concerns.
Undoubtedly, the quality of the instrumental variables is important for the consistency of
such estimation results. In particular, the instruments need to satisfy the relevance and
exclusion restrictions. Table III shows that CDS trading is signicantly associated with
Lender FX Usage and Lender Tier 1 Capital, demonstrating their relevance to CDS trading.
The exclusion restriction is impossible to test formally, as argued by Roberts and Whited
(2012). The instruments we use are economically sound, because they are associated with the
overall hedging interest of the lenders or credit suppliers, and their Tier One capital adequacy
ratio. Moreover, the instruments we use are not weak: The F -test statistics are 56, 11, and
68 individually, and jointly they are above 10 for both IVs, which are statistically signicant.
We next perform additional analysis to account for the discreteness of the CDS Active
variable since the tted values of the rst stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) would
be continuous variables. We classify CDS Active as one if the probability of having CDS
trading is above the median (in the top 50%), or in the top 25% respectively.22 Table IV
shows the second-stage estimation result using both Lender FX Usage and Lender Tier 1
Capital as IVs. Our instrumented CDS Active variable is signicant in all our specications.
Furthermore, we run the Sargan over-identication test and cannot reject the hypothesis
that both IVs are exogenous. Note that the purpose of the IV estimation is to control the
endogeneity in the specic timing of CDS introduction. We next directly address the selection
of rms into the CDS sample.
C.2. Heckman Treatment Eects Model
The selection of rms for CDS trading is analogous to the missing data problem in the
spirit of Heckman (1979) as we do not observe the counterfactual outcome (CDS active rms
without CDS trading). Therefore, correcting for self-selection can be viewed as including an
omitted variable that is proxied by the Inverse Mills Ratio from the rst stage of the Heckman
procedure to produce a consistent estimate.23 The selection models for CDS trading are the
22Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2012) employ a similar method.
23We note that the Heckman model assumes a bivariate normal distribution for the error terms of the
rst-stage and second-stage regressions. Thus far, there is no theory regarding alternative distributional
assumptions. Theoretically, the exclusion restriction is not necessary in all applications of the Heckman
selection model if the model is identied merely on account of its nonlinearity, although it is safe to impose
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same probit models that underlie Table III. Based on the estimated model parameters from the
rst stage, we calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio, which is a transformation of these predicted
individual probabilities of CDS trading. Then, the second stage of the hazard model analysis
includes the Inverse Mills Ratio as an additional explanatory variable. We include all rm
observations in our second-stage analysis.
The second-stage results of the Heckman correction with instrument variables are pre-
sented in Table V. We use all three CDS prediction models for the rst-stage estimation to
generate the Inverse Mills Ratio. We nd that CDS Active has a positive and signicant
coecient estimate in all specications. In other words, rms are more likely to go bankrupt
after the introduction of CDS trading. The economic magnitude of the coecient is also
large. For example, from Model 3 in the rst stage, the marginal eect of CDS trading on
bankruptcy ling is 0.37%, compared with the average bankruptcy probability of 0.14% in
the overall sample. Testing the signicance of the Inverse Mills Ratio is a test of whether the
private information possessed by CDS traders explains the outcome, i.e., bankruptcy ling.
The coecient of Inverse Mills Ratio is insignicant. These results show that the positive
relationship between CDS trading and bankruptcy risk is robust to the selection of rms for
CDS trading.24
C.3. Propensity Score Matching
We now re-estimate our baseline model using a propensity score matched sample. Propensity
score matching makes the \treatment eect" easy to interpret as the dierence between the
CDS rms and those without CDS traded is measured by the coecient of CDS Active. For
each CDS rm, we nd one matching non-CDS rm with the nearest propensity score for
CDS trading. We then run the hazard rate model on this matched sample. We use the
three CDS prediction models from Table III and three dierent matching criteria: (1) the
one non-CDS rm with the nearest distance, in terms of propensity score, to the CDS rm;
(2) the one rm with the nearest propensity score but within a dierence of 1%, and (3) the
two rms with propensity scores closest to the CDS-trading rm. We nd that there are no
signicant dierences in either the propensity scores or the Z -score between the CDS rms
the exclusion restriction as the selection can be approximately linear in the relevant region. Also, employing
multiple instruments can be helpful if they improve the predictability of the rst stage.
24We also tried two other instrumental variables: TRACE Coverage and Post CFMA. The pricing of CDS
might be easier for rms in the TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine) database of the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), due to the ease of obtaining market information in a timely manner
in an OTC market. This will increase the probability of CDS trading for these rms. The Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) ensures the deregulation of OTC derivatives. Therefore, rms are more
likely to have CDS trading in the post-CFMA period. As expected, we nd these instruments to be signicant
determinants of CDS trading. The CDS eect is also signicant using these instruments, although they are
not our rst choices, as shown in Table A9.
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and the matching rms, for all prediction models.
Table VI presents the regression results for our CDS-trading propensity-matched sample.
In all specications, the coecient estimates for CDS Active are signicantly positive. There-
fore, the probability of bankruptcy increases after CDS trading has begun, even adjusting for
the propensity for CDS trading. CDS Firm is not signicant in any specication. (We only
present the results for the bankruptcy prediction and for the specication with the control,
CDS rm, to conserve space.) Therefore, after matching by the propensity for CDS trading,
CDS rms are no longer statistically signicantly dierent from non-CDS rms in terms of
credit quality deterioration, attesting to the eectiveness of our matching procedure. We use
CDS prediction Model 3 and the \nearest one" matching as a benchmark case (reported in the
second column of Table VI). When we modify the matching criterion from the \nearest one" to
the \nearest one with propensity score dierence within 1%", the results are similar to those
in column 2 without the 1% restriction. As an alternative, we choose two matching rms with
the nearest propensity scores from Model 3, and still nd a signicant coecient estimate for
CDS Active. Furthermore, we also use Models 1 and 2 with the nearest-one propensity score
matching. These models produce dierent matching samples, due to the data available to
calculate propensity scores for each prediction model. CDS Active is signicant in all these
other specications.
C.4. Dierence-in-Dierence Analysis
Another approach that can be used to address the endogeneity concerns and identify the
treatment eect (of the introduction of CDS trading) is dierence-in-dierence analysis. Sim-
ilarly to in our propensity score matching analysis, we identify non-CDS rms matching the
CDS rms using all three CDS prediction models presented in Table III and three dierent
matching criteria: (1) the one non-CDS rm with the nearest distance, in terms of propen-
sity score, to the CDS rm; (2) the one rm with the nearest propensity score but within
a dierence of 1%, and (3) the two rms with propensity scores closest to the CDS-trading
rm in question. Furthermore, we consider three windows for the event analysis: year t   1
to year t+ 1, year t  1 to year t+ 2, and year t  1 to year t+ 3 (where year t is the year of
introduction of CDS trading).
We cannot run the dierence-in-dierence analysis on the binary bankruptcy event di-
rectly. Therefore, we examine a continuous measure of probability of default: the expected
default frequency (EDF ), which is a normal transformation of the distance-to-default (EDF =
N( DD)). The calculation of DD follows Bharath and Shumway (2008), with an adjustment
for the leverage ratio of nancial rms. There are several advantages to choosing EDF as the
relevant variable to track. First, EDF is a continuous measure of credit quality. Therefore,
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the estimation has more power and the CDS introduction eect can be more easily identied.
Second, using EDF enriches our empirical framework of credit risk measured by downgrading
and bankruptcy ling. While also being a measure of credit risk, the EDF measure is suf-
ciently dierent from rating downgrades and bankruptcy ling, as it is inferred from stock
prices and balance sheet variables. Last, EDF is an ex ante measure of credit risk, while
we can only observe downgrading and bankruptcy ex post. Using an alternative credit risk
measure also helps demonstrate the robustness of our conclusion.
Panel A of Table VII shows that the EDF dierence-in-dierence estimates are both
statistically and economically signicant for the (t  1; t+2) and (t  1; t+3) event windows
regardless of the CDS prediction model or matching criteria. For example, compared to the
\nearest-one" propensity score matched rm from CDS Prediction Model 3, the EDF is 4.0%
higher three years after CDS introduction. Recall that the average CDS rms has a BBB
rating at the time of CDS introduction. Such an increase in EDF is substantial, given that
the average BBB (BB) U.S. rm's 3-year default probability was about 1.2% (5.4%), from
1981 to 2011, according to Standard & Poor's (2012). The dierence-in-dierence estimates
are insignicant for event window (t   1; t + 1), except when we use two matching rms.
Therefore, the decline in credit quality after beginning CDS trading is rather gradual: there
is little noticeable eect in the rst year, but the eect is signicant thereafter.
In Panel B of Table VII, we nd that the leverage ratios of the reference rms also increase
signicantly after CDS introduction. In the dierence-in-dierence estimation using CDS
Prediction Model 3 for the matching and event window (t   1; t + 2), leverage increases by
between 1.0% and 1.2% after CDS introduction. Our nding regarding the magnitude of the
change in leverage following the instigation of CDS trading is consistent with the conclusions
of Saretto and Tookes (2012). Further, the leverage reaction seems more rapid: the leverage
increases occur mostly in the rst year after CDS trading begins.
C.5. Falsication Test
We have considered the appropriate approaches to addressing selection and endogeneity con-
cerns suggested by the literature.25 Since CDS are traded over-the-counter, there could be
measurement error resulting from the (unobservable) exact date of CDS introduction. Such
a measurement error may lead to an attenuation bias, although this may not always be the
case. We further conduct a falsication test as suggested by Roberts and Whited (2012).
When we shift forward the CDS introduction by one year, the eect of CDS Active becomes
25We also considered the BBB/BB boundary for the separation between investment and speculative grades
in the spirit of a regression discontinuity. Although we do not present a detailed economic model for how this
boundary, and its clientele eects among investors, aects CDS trading, the results in Table A7 show that
the eect of CDS trading is more pronounced for speculative grade rms.
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insignicant, as shown in Table A10. This nding demonstrates the importance of the cor-
rect identication of the timing of CDS introduction, as well as the eect of CDS trading.
Therefore, our falsication test of shifting the year of CDS introduction by one year suggests
that the measurement error would indeed attenuate or even eliminate our results.
D. Eect of Outstanding CDS Positions
Our analysis so far has focused on the CDS introduction eect captured by a binary variable,
CDS Active, which is a permanent regime variable. That is, once CDS trading is initiated
for a rm, it cannot go back to being a non-CDS rm. Such a regime variable ignores much
of the information in the variation in CDS trading over time. Indeed, CDS trading activity
varies considerably across rms. Such variations may generate additional implications for the
eects of CDS trading on credit risk. If the CDS trading activity of a rm is very thin or
illiquid, the corresponding CDS eect may be less pronounced. Also, a larger outstanding
position in CDS may generate greater monetary consequences for CDS traders. Intuitively,
for instance, if CDS trading causes credit risk changes, the inuence of CDS on credit risk
should disappear when all outstanding CDS contracts mature and are extinguished. In this
subsection, we provide a stronger test for such a symmetric and continuous eect of CDS
trading.
A unique advantage of our CDS transactions database is that it includes details about the
notional amount of the CDS contracts outstanding and the contractual specications of each
contract. Such detailed information is useful for forming other measures of CDS trading. As
pointed out by Li and Prabhala (2007), the magnitude of the selection variable (i.e., quantity
of CDS trading or amount outstanding) introduces an independent source of variation and
helps the identication of the treatment eect, while ameliorating the selection concern.
We use CDS transaction records to measure outstanding CDS contracts (similar to cumu-
lative trading volume) in our sample. We use the Number of Live CDS Contracts, measured
by the number of CDS contracts initiated but yet to mature as of the observation month,
as a measure of open interest.26 This variable measures the breadth and consistency of CDS
trading activity. CDS exposure computed as the Number of Live CDS Contracts may go up
or down as and when new CDS contracts are created or old contracts mature. Therefore,
this continuous measure is not as strongly aected by the selection issue analyzed at length
in Section IV.C.
We conjecture that CDS eects will be stronger for rms with greater amounts of CDS
outstanding. We estimate the hazard model of bankruptcy ling using the CDS exposure
26Since CDS contracts are dened by their maturity, rather than their maturity date, new contracts are
potentially created each trading day, depending on the level of trading activity.
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measure instead of the indicator variable CDS Active. Table VIII reports our estimation
results. We set outstanding CDS positions at zero for all non-CDS rms and include both
CDS and non-CDS rms in Specication 1 of Table VIII. The estimation result shows that
bankruptcy risk increases with the number of live CDS contracts, evidenced by the signicant
positive coecient estimate for the Number of Live CDS Contracts. The marginal eect of
this variable on the probability of bankruptcy is 0.03%. That is, when the number of CDS
contracts outstanding increases by 33, its probability of default increases by 1%.
The pseudo-R2 for Specication 1 of Table VIII is lower than in the previous analysis
using the variable CDS Active. It is possible that the aggregate continuous variable, Number
of Live CDS Contracts, is a noisy measure of the incentives of individual creditors, who may
be \over-insured". Moreover, the incentive eects implied by the size of the CDS position may
be concave: They may atten out when the outstanding amount of CDS reaches a certain
level.
In Specication 2 of Table VIII, we only include CDS rms for the bankruptcy prediction
using Number of Live CDS Contracts. The result shows that, the greater is the Number of Live
CDS Contracts, the higher is the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, even within the CDS
sample, the number of CDS contracts outstanding plays a role in determining bankruptcy
risk. In summary, a larger amount of CDS contracts outstanding is associated with a higher
probability of rm bankruptcy.
E. The Mechanisms for the Eect of CDS on Credit Risk
Previous analysis shows a robust relation between CDS trading and the credit risk of the
reference rms. In this subsection, we examine several mechanisms channeling the eect of
CDS trading towards an increase in credit risk. There are two broad channels through which a
rm's bankruptcy risk could increase. The rst way is through a higher chance of getting into
nancial distress. The second is through a lower chance of getting out of nancial distress,
leaving bankruptcy as the more likely outcome. CDS contracts can aect a rm's credit risk
in both of these ways.
Firms can slip into nancial distress more easily when there is CDS trading if they take
on more debt, increase their asset risk, become less protable, or have more pro-cyclical cash
ows (i.e., have higher downside risk correlated with market conditions). Indeed, both our
result in Panel B of Table VII and the ndings in Saretto and Tookes (2012) show that rm
leverage increases following the inception of CDS trading. The increase in leverage naturally
leads to an increase in credit risk. Therefore, we control for rm leverage in our regressions,
both before and after the introduction of CDS, and focus on other mechanisms.
CDS can reduce protability if there is negative feedback from the CDS market to the
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product market. In such a case, a negative shock, even though it could be pure noise, would
reduce the sales and prots of the rm. This feedback eect could be used by market manip-
ulators to accentuate the eect of the shock. Firm performance can become more correlated
with the CDS market if the CDS market transmits negative information to market partici-
pants. This type of information mechanism is especially harmful during downturns. However,
CDS can also reduce the information available about rms if lenders reduce monitoring and
produce less information about the borrowers when their exposure to borrower default is
hedged with CDS. Before we discuss these fundamental mechanisms, we study two other
mechanisms that reduce the chance of successful debt workouts for rms in nancial distress.
The rst is that lenders can be tougher once they are protected by CDS. The second is that
creditor coordination is more dicult when there is CDS trading since their interests may not
be aligned.
E.1. Tough Creditors Opposing Restructuring
The rst mechanism besides leverage that we investigate is due to tougher creditors, as in
the Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model for empty creditors. That is, creditors insured with
CDS protection will be tougher in the renegotiation of existing debt obligations, and conse-
quently restructuring will be less successful, as shown in the illustrative example presented
in Appendix A.27 The driver of the empty creditor mechanism is the extent of over-insurance
by lenders using CDS contracts. This over-insurance with CDS directly drives the lenders'
incentive to force borrowers into bankruptcy by rejecting restructuring proposals, precipi-
tating a default event and therefore receiving payments from CDS sellers. The greater the
degree of over-insurance by the empty creditor, the larger will be the benet from rejecting a
restructure and potentially triggering bankruptcy.
Our data do not reveal the identity of individual CDS traders. Hence, we cannot directly
observe the presence of individual empty creditors or their portfolio positions. Consequently,
we have to make do with aggregate proxies for the inception of CDS trading as a (noisy)
proxy for the potential inuence of empty creditors. If we make the assumption that the
presence of CDS implies a higher probability of empty creditors than among non-CDS rms,
then our baseline nding is consistent with the empty creditor prediction. We calculate the
ratio of the notional dollar amount of CDS contracts outstanding to the total dollar amount
of debt outstanding at the same time, CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt.28 We scale
27The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 prohibits public debt restructuring without unanimous consent. Hence,
public debt restructuring usually takes the form of exchange oers. As a consequence, there could be a
potential holdout problem, since some bondholders may not participate in the oer. In this context, James
(1996) shows that bank debt forgiveness is important for the success of public debt exchange oers.
28The maximum value for CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt is 4.14, which is suggestive of over-
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the CDS position by total debt to relate the dollar amount of CDS outstanding to creditors'
exposure. CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt is a somewhat more informative, but still
noisy, measure of the extent of the empty creditor concern. We emphasize that we do not need
all creditors to become empty creditors for the empty creditor mechanism to manifest itself;
it may take just a few or even one large empty creditor to holdout a restructuring proposal.
We conjecture that bankruptcy risk is higher when CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt
is larger. The estimation results, reported in Table IX, are consistent with the conjecture:
A larger dollar amount of CDS contracts outstanding relative to rm's debt outstanding is
associated with a higher probability of rm bankruptcy.
Empty creditors will clearly prefer rms to declare bankruptcy rather than have the rm's
debt restructured only if bankruptcy, but not restructuring, triggers a credit event for CDS
contracts and generates payments to CDS buyers. Empty creditors will not have this incentive
to the same degree if their CDS contracts also cover restructuring as a credit event. Thus,
the strength of the empty creditor mechanism depends crucially on the denition of the
restructuring clause in the CDS contract.
We investigate the eect of dierences in contractual terms on the credit risk consequences
of CDS trading. Appendix B describes the restructuring clauses in CDS contracts and their
historical evolution. Essentially, there are four types of CDS contract, based on the denition
of credit events: full restructuring (FR), modied restructuring (MR), modied-modied re-
structuring (MMR), and no restructuring (NR). For FR contracts, any type of restructuring
qualies as a trigger event, and any debt obligation with a maturity of up to 30 years can
be delivered in that event. Under MR also, any restructuring is included as a credit event;
however, the deliverable obligations are limited to those with maturities within 30 months of
the CDS contract's maturity. For MMR contracts, the deliverable obligations are relaxed to
include those with maturities within 60 months of the CDS contract's maturity for restruc-
tured debt, and 30 months for other obligations. Under NR, restructuring is excluded as a
credit event. Firms with more NR contracts are more subject to the empty creditor threat
than those with other types of CDS. FR contracts would not be as strongly inuenced by the
empty creditor incentives, as illustrated by the analysis in Appendix A.29
Figure 2 plots the number of contracts of each type in each year as observed in our CDS
insurance for such rms and the potential presence of \empty creditors". (The mean is 0.10 and the median
is 0.02.)
29Another related issue is the type of settlement. In the past, most CDS contracts were settled by physical
delivery (CDS buyers delivered bonds to sellers to receive the face value). More recently, cash settlement
has been the norm (CDS sellers pay the dierence between the face value and its recovery value directly
to CDS buyers). Contracts settled by physical delivery may have an additional inuence from the empty
creditor problem, since they may cause a squeeze in the bond market. In addition, physical delivery confers
an additional \cheapest to deliver" option on the CDS protection buyer. Unfortunately, however, we do not
have data on the delivery method.
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transaction records. The majority of rms in our sample have the MR type of clause in their
CDS contracts. Types FR and MMR have a negligible presence in our sample, which is quite
representative of the market as a whole, although there could be some variation at the rm
level. The gure shows that there were hardly any NR CDS contracts prior to 2002. Packer
and Zhu (2005) show that, in their sample period, MR contracts were just slightly more
expensive than NR contracts. In such circumstances, CDS buyers would probably buy MR
contracts rather than NR contracts. The proportion of CDS contracts with NR specications
has increased dramatically in recent years, especially in 2007. The median (mean) fraction
of NR contracts out of all CDS contracts for a reference entity is 0.61 (0.55). We also nd
that there is wide variation across rms in terms of the proportion of NR contracts. One
may be concerned with the endogeneity in choice of contract type, i.e., CDS buyers expecting
bankruptcy to be more likely than restructuring will buy CDS contracts covering bankruptcy
only. However, such endogeneity would have the same implication as when holders of NR
CDS contracts have a clear preference for bankruptcy.
We account for the dierences in contractual specications in the estimations reported
in Table X, which include variables measuring the type of CDS contract. No Restructuring
CDS Proportion is the fraction of CDS contracts with NR clauses out of all CDS contracts
on the same reference entity. (This measure would be zero for rms without CDS.) Similarly,
Modied Restructuring CDS Proportion is the fraction of CDS with MR clauses out of all
contracts on the same reference entity. Since there are very few contracts with the FR or
MMR specication in our sample, we focus only on the MR and NR types. We run separate
regressions with the two CDS-type variables (reported in Specication 1 and Specication
2), and also a combined one with both of them (Specication 3). The results in Table X
show that only for NR contracts do we nd a signicant positive relationship of CDS trading
with bankruptcy risk, while the coecient of the MR type is not statistically signicant. The
marginal eect of the No Restructuring CDS Proportion variable in the combined regression
on the probability of bankruptcy is 0.22% in Specication 3: the default probability of a
rm with all NR CDS is 0.22% higher than that of a rm with no NR CDS. This magnitude
is large in comparison to the overall sample default probability of 0.14%. We include year
dummies in our regressions to control for potential time series patterns in the composition of
CDS contract types.30
We nd that the regressions reported in Table X have higher pseudo-R2s than those in
Table IX, suggesting that the specication with restructuring information relating to the
contracts ts the data better. Therefore, the eect of CDS Active seems to be driven by the
30We also segmented the sample by time, to test for the secular evolution of contract terms. We expected
that the restructuring concern should have been less material in inuencing credit risk prior to 2000, when
restructuring was normally included as a credit event in CDS contracts. In results not reported here, we nd
that the CDS trading eect is indeed signicant only in more recent years.
26
CDS contracts with NR clauses. This nding on restructuring will likely be relevant to many
more reference names in the future as more and more corporate CDS contracts use NR as the
credit event specication (e.g., all CDS index constituents of the North America investment
grade index CDX.NA.IG), especially after the CDS Big Bang in 2009.
The results on CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt and No Restructuring CDS Propor-
tion are consistent with the empty creditor model. Therefore, one mechanism for the CDS
eect on credit risk is due to creditors becoming tougher in debt renegotiation, and conse-
quently causing rms to le for bankruptcy. We note two caveats. First, empty creditors are
only part of the market. CDS can be traded by any buyer and seller pair, and not just by
the current creditors. CDS trading by parties unrelated to the reference rms would weaken
the empty creditor mechanism and make it less likely for us to nd signicant CDS trading
eects. Second, not all empty creditors can successfully force the borrower into bankruptcy.
E.2. Creditor Coordination Failure
Besides tough creditors causing bankruptcy on individual bases, creditor coordination is an-
other important consideration for debt workout. If rms borrow money from a larger number
of lenders after the inception of CDS trading, creditor coordination will be more dicult and
bankruptcy more likely. Lead banks will probably not want to appear to drive their borrow-
ers into bankruptcy, as the long-run reputational damage may outweigh the short-run gains
from empty creditor trading prots. However, other lenders such as hedge funds or private
equity players, who are not similarly constrained, may take advantage of CDS trading more
intensively. Therefore, CDS trading may aect the size and composition of lenders to a rm.
We investigate the impact of CDS introduction on the creditor relationships of a rm. The
overall creditor relationship is represented in our analysis by the lending relationships available
from DealScan LPC data.31 For each rm in a given month, we examine the prior ve-year
period for any syndicated loan facilities for this rm. Summing over all such active facilities,
we compute the number of unique banks lending to the rm. MNumber of Banks is the change
in the number of bank relationships from one year before the inception of CDS trading to
two years after the inception of CDS trading. First, from a univariate dierence-in-dierence
analysis, we nd that the number of bank relationships of a rm increases signicantly by 1.4,
one year after the inception of CDS trading, and by 3, two years after CDS trading, relative
to rms matched using the CDS trading prediction models discussed in Section IV.C. Second,
we regress MNumber of Banks from the year before to two years after CDS trading started on
a set of rm characteristics, and the CDS Active variable for CDS rms only. These \event
31The construction of the dataset is detailed by Chava and Roberts (2008). We thank Michael Roberts for
providing the DealScan-Compustat linking le.
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study" results are reported in Panel A of Table XI. We nd that CDS trading signicantly
increases the number of lenders that a rm has. On average, rms have 2.4 more lenders
two years after CDS introduction, controlling for other factors that may aect the number of
lenders, such as rm size and leverage.
The relationship between the number of lenders and bankruptcy risk has previously been
documented by, among others, Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) and Brunner and Krahnen
(2008). We present similar evidence from our sample, also including the eect of CDS trading,
in Panel B of Table XI. We include the Number of Banks as an additional explanatory variable
in the hazard model of the rm's probability of bankruptcy. The results indicate that a rm's
bankruptcy risk increases with the number of banking relationships, even after controlling
for the direct impact of CDS trading. Therefore, the results in Table XI support Hypothesis
4 that CDS trading increases the number of creditors, which, in turn, increases bankruptcy
risk.
E.3. Other Mechanisms and Further Discussion
Besides leverage, tough creditors and coordination failure, another potential channel for the
CDS trading eect is via the feedback from CDS pricing. On the one hand, if CDS spreads
are too high relative to the corresponding bond yield spreads, this may feed back to the rm's
bond market through arbitrage between the two markets, making it more costly and dicult
for the rm to renance its obligations. In turn, this may cause the operating environment
to worsen, leading to a deterioration of the rm's credit quality.32 High CDS spreads also
increase the cost of buying CDS protection, and hence reduce the incentive of creditors to
become empty creditors and deter potential market manipulation. If, on the other hand, CDS
spreads are underpriced or too low, informed traders have a greater incentive to buy CDS
contracts and expect to make prots from the subsequent increase in CDS spreads.33
Our last consideration of mechanisms is the information content of CDS trading. CDS
provide traders with a relatively simple instrument for going short a rm's credit. The CDS
market can provide information about a rm's credit quality, especially its downside risk.
Therefore, it is possible that some rms become riskier after CDS trading as information is
impounded into prices more quickly, perhaps causing higher equity, bond, and asset volatility.
This information channel could be consistent with our nding of higher credit risk after CDS
trading.34
32See, \A Market Backres and Investors Pay," by Henry Sender, Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2002.
33In Table A11, we nd that the eect of CDS trading on bankruptcy risk is signicant for both rms with
CDS that is likely overpriced and those for which it is underpriced (as predicted by the basis between the CDS
and bond yield spreads). Moreover, there is no statistically signicant dierence between these two groups.
34We split our sample by analyst coverage in Table A12, and nd a signicant CDS eect for rms with both
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In summary, we do not nd evidence for the feedback and information channels of CDS
trading eects. On the other hand, we nd strong evidence for the leverage, tougher creditor
and coordination failure channels. Therefore, while we are less certain about whether CDS
lead rms into nancial distress, our evidence is relatively clear that CDS increase the chances
of bankruptcy compared with restructuring, for nancially distressed rms.
V. Concluding Remarks
We nd strong evidence that the bankruptcy risk of reference rms increases after the in-
ception of CDS trading, using a comprehensive dataset of North American corporate CDS
transaction records over the period 1997-2009. This eect of CDS trading on credit risk is
economically large: The odds of bankruptcy more than double after CDS trading begins for
average rms. This nding is robust to the selection and endogeneity in CDS trading, using
the lender's FX hedging and Tier One capital ratio as instrumental variables. We also nd
that the the eect of CDS trading is related to the amount of CDS outstanding. Therefore,
the bankruptcy risk of rms increases when CDS positions accumulate, and decreases when
CDS contracts expire. The eect of CDS on bankruptcy risk is more pronounced when CDS
payments do not cover restructuring. Moreover, the number of lenders increases after CDS
trading begins, exacerbating the problems of creditor coordination.
This study uncovers a real consequence of CDS trading and contributes to the ongoing
debate on this important derivative market. We emphasize that, although according to our
ndings rms become more vulnerable to bankruptcy once CDS start trading on them, this
does not imply that CDS trading necessarily reduces social welfare. Indeed, CDS can increase
debt capacity, and many previously unqualied projects may get funded due to the possibility
of credit risk mitigation aorded by the CDS. Therefore, the cost associated with an increase in
bankruptcy risk could be oset by the benets of an enlarged credit supply. Future work could
examine the tradeo between the increased debt capacity and the bankruptcy vulnerability
caused by CDS, shedding light on the overall impact of CDS trading on allocative eciency.
high and low analyst coverage. The eect is not statistically dierent between those sub-samples, suggesting
that the CDS eect is not related to the information environment in which a rm operates.
29
Appendices
A Illustration of CDS Eects on Bankruptcy Risk
We use a simple example of a reduced-form nature to illustrate how CDS trading by creditors
aects the likelihood of bankruptcy. The example is intended to convey the basic intuition
of the incentives of creditors with CDS positions, and is based on the model of Bolton and
Oehmke (2011).
First, consider the case where there is no CDS traded on a rm. Assume that creditors
lend X to the rm. If the rm is in nancial distress and consequently declares bankruptcy,
creditors will recover r  X, where r is the recovery rate in bankruptcy. Consider, on the
other hand, that the creditors allow the rm to restructure the debt, since the recovery value
of the assets in bankruptcy is less than its value as a going concern. Suppose the rm oers
the creditors part of the dierence between the \going concern" value and the recovery value
of the assets in bankruptcy, and agrees to pay them say R  X, with R > r. Clearly, the
creditors would consider such a restructuring favorably, and try to avoid bankruptcy.35 In
general, restructuring would dominate bankruptcy.
Suppose next that the creditors can also buy CDS protection against the rm's credit
events. Clearly, bankruptcy would always be dened as a credit event. However, restructuring
may or may not be dened as a credit event, as per the clauses of the CDS contract. If
restructuring is included as a credit event, we call the contract a \full restructuring" (FR)
CDS. If it is not, we call it a \no restructuring" (NR) CDS.36 In the case of FR CDS, assume
that the CDS premium (price) is F , in present value terms, at the time of default and that the
creditors buy CDS against Y of notional value of the CDS. If the rm defaults, the creditors'
total payo with CDS protection is [rX +(1  r F )Y ] in the event of bankruptcy, and
[RX + (1 R  F ) Y ] if the debt is restructured. Therefore, the creditors are better o
with bankruptcy than with restructuring if
[r X + (1  r   F ) Y ] > [RX + (1 R  F ) Y ];
i.e., when Y > X, since R > r. Hence, bankruptcy dominates restructuring as a choice for
creditors for whom the amount of CDS purchased exceeds the bonds held (\empty creditors"),
even when restructuring is covered by the CDS. In the equilibrium model of Bolton and
35The precise size of R would be determined in a bargaining process between the creditors and the share-
holders of the rm.
36Other types of CDS contracts also exist, but are not relevant for the purpose of this simple illustration.
See Appendix B for a discussion of contract clauses.
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Oehmke (2011), CDS sellers fully anticipate this incentive of CDS buyers, and price it into
the CDS premium. Although CDS sellers may have an incentive to bail out the reference rms
(by injecting more capital as long as it is less than the CDS payout) in order not to trigger
CDS payments, they cannot do so unilaterally, since the empty creditors who are the CDS
buyers, and other creditors, will mostly decide the fate of the company as any new nancing
would require the existing creditors' approval. CDS sellers are not part of this negotiation
process.
Now consider the case of NR CDS. Assume that the CDS premium, in this case, is f in
present value terms, where f < F . Suppose again that the creditors buy CDS against Y of
notional value of the CDS. Therefore, if the rm defaults, the creditors' total payo with CDS
protection is [r X + (1   r   f)  Y ] in the event of bankruptcy, and [R X   f  Y ] if
the debt is restructured. Bankruptcy is a preferred outcome for the creditors if





which can be true even when Y < X, since R < 1. Thus, for NR CDS, bankruptcy is
preferred when even a relatively small amount of CDS are purchased; hence, bankruptcy is
the preferred outcome for a larger range of holdings of NR CDS by the creditors. It is also
evident that buying CDS protection with NR CDS contracts is more protable in bankruptcy
than restructuring without CDS protection, so long as
[r X + (1  r   f) Y ] > RX;
which is equivalent to saying that 37
Y >
R  r
1  r   f X:
The above condition is met when Y > X, as long as R < 1 f , which is almost always true as
the cost of CDS protection is usually lower than the loss in the event of restructuring. Even if
Y < X, the condition is likely to hold, for reasonable values of R and f . Further, the greater
the dierence between Y and X, the greater will be the incentive for creditors to push the
rm into bankruptcy.
Our parsimonious illustration skips many details of the equilibrium model of Bolton and
Oehmke (2011) in order to capture the main intuition and predictions. We refer interested
37The calculation for the FR CDS is the same, except that the fee is replaced by F instead of f . The precise
range of values for Y relative to X would be smaller than for the NR CDS, as argued above.
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readers to Bolton and Oehmke's (2011) theory for a more rigorous treatment. To recap,
we demonstrate that a) creditors have an incentive to over-insure and push the rm into
bankruptcy, b) this incentive increases with the dierence between Y and X, i.e., the amount
of CDS contracts outstanding relative to the rm's debt, and c) the probability of bankruptcy
occurring is greater for NR CDS contracts.
B Credit Default Swaps Credit Event Denitions
Credit default swaps (CDS) provide insurance protection against the default of a reference
entity's debt. For the buyer of protection to obtain payment from a CDS contract, a credit
event must be triggered. Following such an event, the CDS contract can be settled either by
physical delivery (by delivering the reference security and receiving the notional principal)
or payment of cash (by receiving the dierence between the notional principal and the price
of the reference security). The trade organization of participants in the derivatives market,
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), sets the standards for the con-
tractual terms of CDS contracts, including the denition of trigger events, the delivery and
settlement process, and other details.
Based on the 1999 ISDA Credit Event Denitions, there are six categories of trigger events
for calling a default for dierent obligors: bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation acceleration,
obligation default, repudiation/moratorium and restructuring. For CDS linked to corporate
debt, the primary trigger events are bankruptcy, failure to pay and restructuring. Under
this denition, known as full restructuring (FR), any restructuring qualies as a trigger
event, and any obligations with a maturity up to 30 years can be delivered. This creates
a \cheapest to deliver" option for protection buyers who will benet by delivering the least
expensive instrument in the event of default. The broad denition of deliverable obligations
was intended to create a standard hedge contract with a wide range of protection possibilities
for the credit risk of the reference entity.
However, the restructuring of Conseco Finance on 22 September 2000 highlighted the
problems with the 1999 ISDA Credit Event Denitions. The bank debt of Conseco Finance
was restructured to the benet of the debt holders. Yet, the restructuring event still triggered
payments from outstanding CDS contracts. To settle the CDS position, CDS holders also
utilized the cheapest-to-deliver option created by the broad denition of deliverable obligations
and delivered long-maturity, deeply discounted bonds in exchange for the notional amount.
To address this obvious lacuna, ISDA modied CDS contracts and dened a new structure
known as modied restructuring (MR). Under this 2001 ISDA Supplement Denition, any
restructuring is dened as a credit event. However, the deliverable obligations are limited to
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those with maturities within 30 months of the CDS contract's maturity.
In March 2003, ISDA made another change and introduced modied-modied restruc-
turing contracts (MMR) to relax the limitation on deliverable obligations. The deliverable
obligations were relaxed to those with maturities within 60 months of the CDS contract's
maturity for restructured debt, and 30 months for other obligations. Thus, following the 2003
ISDA Credit Derivative Denitions, there are four types of restructuring clauses: full restruc-
turing (FR), modied restructuring (MR), modied-modied restructuring (MMR) and no
restructuring (NR). For CDS contracts with NR as the restructuring clause, restructuring
is excluded as a credit event: the credit event has to be either bankruptcy or the failure
to pay. To further standardize the CDS market, since April 2009, ISDA has not included
restructuring as a credit event for North American CDS contracts.
To sum up, based on the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivative Denitions, there are four types
of restructuring clauses: FR, MR, MMR and NR. The credit event in all cases includes
bankruptcy and failure to pay. For CDS contracts under FR, the event also includes restruc-
turing. Under NR, restructuring is excluded as a credit event. The other types include re-
structuring as a credit event, but dier in terms of the maturity of the deliverable obligations,
MR being more restrictive than MMR. By 2009, the rules essentially excluded restructuring
as a credit event for all North American corporate CDS contracts.
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Figure 1: Rating Distribution Around the Introduction of Credit Default Swaps. This
gure plots the credit rating distributions for rms with credit default swaps (CDS), before the
inception of CDS trading and two years after the inception of CDS trading. The credit ratings are
taken from S&P Credit Ratings. The CDS data come from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. There
are 901 rms in our sample that have CDS traded at some point during the sample period of June
1997 to April 2009.
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Figure 2: Credit Default Swaps Restructuring Clauses by Year. This gure plots the
distribution of credit default swaps (CDS) restructuring clauses, by year, in our sample, between
1997 and 2009. The CDS data are taken from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. There are four
types of contract terms related to restructuring: full restructuring (FR), modied restructuring
(MR), modied-modied restructuring (MMR), and no restructuring (NR). For rms with NR in
the restructuring clause, the credit events do not include restructuring, while for the other types,
they do. MR and MMR contracts impose restrictions on the types of bond that can be delivered in
the event of default.
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Table I
Credit Default Swaps Trading and Bankruptcies by Year
This table reports the distribution of rms, including those with credit default swaps (CDS) traded, and
bankruptcy events, by year, in our sample between 1997 and 2009. The sample of all rms is drawn
from Compustat, and includes all companies in the database during 1997-2009. The CDS data are taken
from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. There are 901 rms in our sample that have CDS traded at some
point during the sample period of June 1997 to April 2009. The bankruptcy data are obtained from
New Generation Research's \Public and Major Company Database", the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy
Research Database (BRD), the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Bankruptcy List, the Fixed Income Securities
Database (FISD) and Moody's Annual Reports on Bankruptcy and Recovery. The combined database
includes all public companies that led for bankruptcy during the period; it also includes selected private
rms that are deemed signicant. The rst column in the table is the year. The second column in the
table shows the total number of U.S. companies included in the Compustat database. The third column
shows the number of bankruptcies in the year. The fourth column reports the number of rms for which
CDS trading was initiated during the year in question. The fth column presents rms with active CDS
trading during each year. The last two columns report the number of CDS rms that led for bankruptcy
and the number of non-CDS rms that led for bankruptcy, respectively. (y from June 1997, z until April 2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Total # # of # of New # of Active # of CDS # of Non-CDS
of Firms Bankruptcies CDS Firms CDS Firms Bankruptcies Bankruptcies
1997y 9366 50 22 22 0 50
1998 9546 92 58 72 0 92
1999 9545 118 55 106 0 118
2000 9163 158 102 196 1 157
2001 8601 257 172 334 8 249
2002 8190 225 221 547 12 213
2003 7876 156 93 582 5 151
2004 7560 86 58 593 0 86
2005 7318 76 73 629 5 71
2006 6993 49 28 533 2 47
2007 6651 61 9 418 1 60
2008 6223 121 9 375 4 117
2009z 5686 179 1 234 22 157
Total 1628 901 60 1568
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Table II
Impact of Credit Default Swaps Trading on Credit Quality
This table presents the estimates of the probabilities of credit downgrades and bankruptcy, using a logistic
model in a sample including rms with credit default swaps (CDS) and all non-CDS rms. ln(E) is the
logarithm of the rm's market value of equity. ln(F) is the logarithm of the book value of the rm's debt,
where book debt is the sum of short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's
annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the
rm's ratio of net income to total assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the probability of credit
downgrades or bankruptcy, we include CDS variables in the model specication. CDS Firm equals one if
the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS Active is a dummy variable that equals one after
the inception of CDS trading and zero before CDS trading. The coecient of interest is that of CDS Active,
which captures the impact of CDS trading on the probability of credit downgrades or bankruptcy after the
inception of CDS trading. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant
at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard
errors.)
Probability of Downgrades Probability of Bankruptcy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(E)  0:735  0:736  0:713  0:710
(0:014) (0:014) (0:024) (0:024)
ln(F) 0:507 0:503 0:711 0:713
(0:015) (0:015) (0:023) (0:023)
1/E  0:062  0:017  1:626  1:675
(0:027) (0:026) (0:131) (0:131)
rit 1   rmt 1  0:281  0:252  1:320  1:331
(0:035) (0:035) (0:111) (0:111)
NI/TA  0:003  0:000  0:038  0:038
(0:025) (0:024) (0:013) (0:013)
CDS Firm 0:755  2:009
(0:057) (0:711)
CDS Active 0:691 1:371 2:373 0:400
(0:067) (0:045) (0:729) (0:177)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 15:08% 14:75% 24:18% 24:06%
N 658966 658966 658966 658966
# of Downgrades (Bankruptcy) 3863 3863 940 940
CDS Active Odds Ratio 1:925 3:939 10:730 1:492
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:39% 0:78% 0:33% 0:06%
Sample Probability of
a Downgrade (Bankruptcy) 0:58% 0:59% 0:14% 0:14%
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Table III
Probability of Credit Default Swaps Trading
This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit default swaps (CDS) trading, obtained using a
probit model. Propensity scores are estimated based on the model parameters. ln(Assets) is the logarithm
of the rm's total assets value. Leverage is dened as the ratio of book debt to the sum of book debt and
market equity, where book debt is the sum of short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt and market equity
is the measure of the number of common shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price. ROA is the
rm's return on assets. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year. Equity Volatility is the
rm's annualized equity volatility. PPENT/Total Asset is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total
assets. Sales/Total Asset is the ratio of sales to total assets. EBIT/Total Asset is the ratio of earnings before
interest and tax to total assets. WCAP/Total Asset is the ratio of working capital to total assets. RE/Total
Asset is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets. Cash/Total Asset is the ratio of cash to total assets.
CAPX/Total Asset is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Investment Grade is a dummy variable
that equals one if the rm has an investment grade (BBB- and above) rating. Rated is a dummy variable that
equals one if the rm is rated. Lender FX Usage is a measure of the FX hedging activities by the lending
banks and underwriters and Lender Tier 1 Capital is the Tier One capital ratio of the lenders. The sample
period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level,
and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Probability of CDS Trading
CDS Prediction CDS Prediction CDS Prediction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ln(Assets) 0:794 0:798 0:795
(0:005) (0:005) (0:005)
Leverage 0:401 0:409 0:400
(0:026) (0:026) (0:026)
ROA  0:019  0:018  0:019
(0:016) (0:017) (0:017)
rit 1   rmt 1  0:100  0:099  0:100
(0:010) (0:010) (0:010)
Equity Volatility 0:067 0:069 0:068
(0:015) (0:015) (0:015)
PPENT/Total Asset 0:349 0:358 0:350
(0:029) (0:029) (0:029)
Sales/Total Asset  0:021  0:021  0:021
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
EBIT/Total Asset 0:249 0:261 0:250
(0:059) (0:060) (0:060)
WCAP/Total Asset 0:149 0:154 0:149
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024)
RE/Total Asset 0:020 0:020 0:020
(0:005) (0:005) (0:005)
Cash/Total Asset 0:251 0:254 0:254
(0:035) (0:035) (0:034)
CAPX/Total Asset  1:833  1:861  1:826
(0:115) (0:115) (0:115)
Investment Grade 0:916 0:912 0:915
(0:013) (0:013) (0:013)
Rated 0:957 0:963 0:957
(0:015) (0:015) (0:015)
Lender FX Usage 2:487 5:523
(0:732) (0:732)
Lender Tier 1 Capital  2:369  2:458
(0:713) (0:713)
F-statistic (instruments) 56:15 11:05 68:10
p-value (F-statistic) 0:000 0:001 0:000
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 38:95% 38:78% 38:97%
N 690111 690111 690111
#CDS Event 551 551 551
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Table IV
Credit Default Swaps Trading and Probability of Bankruptcy:
Instrumental Variable Estimation
This table presents the second-stage estimation results of the instrumental variable estimation. The
second-stage analysis is for the probability of bankruptcy using a logistic model in a sample including rms
with credit default swaps (CDS) and all non-CDS rms. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's market value of
equity. ln(F) is the logarithm of the book value of the rm's debt, where book debt is the sum of short-term
debt and 50% of long-term debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1
is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets.
To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the probability of bankruptcy, we include CDS variables in the
model specication. CDS Firm equals one if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. We classify
CDS Active as one if the probability of having CDS trading is above the median (in the top 50%), or in the
top 25% respectively, the resulting variables being dened as Instrumented CDS Active. The sample period
is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and *
signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
CDS Prediction Model 3
Top 50% Top 25%
ln(E)  0:625  0:623  0:623  0:622
(0:023) (0:023) (0:023) (0:023)
ln(F) 0:642 0:642 0:644 0:644
(0:022) (0:022) (0:022) (0:022)
1/E  1:487  1:505  1:454  1:477
(0:129) (0:128) (0:127) (0:126)
rit 1   rmt 1  1:334  1:336  1:336  1:340
(0:109) (0:109) (0:109) (0:109)
NI/TA  0:033  0:033  0:033  0:033
(0:013) (0:013) (0:013) (0:013)
CDS Firm  0:171  0:261
(0:167) (0:172)
Instrumented CDS Active 0:302 0:294 0:339 0:298
(0:083) (0:083) (0:101) (0:098)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 22:30% 22:29% 22:28% 22:27%
N 657438 657438 657438 657438
# of Bankruptcy 940 940 940 940
CDS Active Odds Ratio 1:353 1:342 1:404 1:347
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:04% 0:04% 0:05% 0:04%
Sample Probability of a Bankruptcy 0:14% 0:14% 0:14% 0:14%
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Table V
Credit Default Swaps Trading and Probability of Bankruptcy:
Heckman Treatment Eects Model with Instrument Variables
This table presents the second-stage estimation results of the two-stage Heckman treatment eects model.
The second-stage analysis is on the probability of bankruptcy, using a logistic model in a sample including
rms with credit default swaps (CDS) and all non-CDS rms. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's market
value of equity. ln(F) is the logarithm of the book value of the rm's debt, where book debt is the sum of
short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility.
rit 1 rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total
assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the probability of bankruptcy, we include CDS variables
in the model specication. CDS Firm equals one if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise.
CDS Active is a dummy variable which equals one after the inception of CDS trading and zero before CDS
trading. The coecient of interest is that of CDS Active, which captures the impact of CDS trading on the
probability of bankruptcy after the inception of CDS trading. The Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated from
the rst-stage probit regression, modeling the probability of CDS trading presented in Table III. The sample
period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level,
and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
CDS Prediction CDS Prediction CDS Prediction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ln(E)  0:639  0:639  0:639
(0:022) (0:022) (0:022)
ln(F) 0:645 0:645 0:645
(0:022) (0:022) (0:022)
1/E  1:400  1:399  1:400
(0:125) (0:125) (0:125)
rit 1   rmt 1  1:330  1:330  1:330
(0:109) (0:109) (0:109)
NI/TA  0:032  0:032  0:032
(0:013) (0:013) (0:013)
CDS Firm  2:270  2:269  2:270
(0:710) (0:710) (0:710)
CDS Active 2:631 2:624 2:630
(0:746) (0:746) (0:746)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0:035 0:040 0:036
(0:124) (0:123) (0:124)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 22:42% 22:42% 22:42%
N 657438 657438 657438
# of Bankruptcy 940 940 940
CDS Active Odds Ratio 13:888 13:791 13:874
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:37% 0:37% 0:37%
Sample Probability
of a Bankruptcy 0:14% 0:14% 0:14%
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Table VI
Credit Default Swaps Trading and Credit Quality: Propensity Score Matching
This table presents the estimates of the probability of bankruptcy using a logistic model in a sample
including rms with credit default swaps (CDS) and non-CDS propensity score matched rms. Propensity
score matched rms are selected based on propensity scores estimated from the model of probability of CDS
trading presented in Table III. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's market value of equity. ln(F) is the
logarithm of the book value of the rm's debt, where book debt is the sum of short-term debt and 50% of
long-term debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's
excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. To estimate the
impact of CDS trading on the probability of bankruptcy, we include CDS variables in the model specication.
CDS Firm equals one if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS Active is a dummy variable
that equals one after the inception of CDS trading and zero before CDS trading. The coecient of interest
is that of CDS Active, which captures the impact of CDS trading on the probability of bankruptcy after
the inception of CDS trading. The second column presents the analysis in the baseline matched sample,
i.e. the \nearest one" propensity score matching rms selected based on CDS prediction model 3 in Table
III. The third column presents the same analysis, but for the \nearest one" with propensity score dierence
within 1%. The fourth column uses the two matching rms with the nearest propensity scores. The last two
columns present the analysis in the matched sample selected based on CDS prediction models 1 and 2 in
Table III. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, **
signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
CDS Prediction CDS Prediction CDS Prediction
Model 3 Model 1 Model 2
Nearest One Nearest One Nearest Two Nearest One Nearest One
Matching PS Di<1% Matching Matching Matching
ln(E)  1:009  1:005  0:869  1:152  0:989
(0:133) (0:138) (0:111) (0:149) (0:133)
ln(F) 0:965 0:918 0:881 1:183 0:993
(0:123) (0:127) (0:102) (0:139) (0:121)
1/E  0:069  0:029  0:309  0:013  0:163
(0:295) (0:295) (0:292) (0:309) (0:301)
rit 1   rmt 1  2:299  2:104  2:738  2:427  2:140
(0:641) (0:647) (0:595) (0:699) (0:628)
NI/TA 0:012  2:478 0:041 0:001  0:006
(0:190) (0:790) (0:122) (0:177) (0:165)
CDS Firm  0:856  0:979  0:797  0:425  0:912
(0:783) (0:813) (0:753) (0:795) (0:783)
CDS Active 1:968 2:215 1:935 1:583 1:947
(0:796) (0:835) (0:770) (0:781) (0:795)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 32:78% 32:79% 33:35% 37:25% 32:14%
N 120975 111331 173665 113886 120494
# of Bankruptcy 49 48 62 45 48
CDS Odds Ratio 7:156 9:161 6:924 4:870 7:008
CDS Marginal Eect 0:08% 0:09% 0:07% 0:05% 0:07%
Sample Probability







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CDS Exposure and the Probability of Bankruptcy
This table investigates the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) exposure on a rm's probability of bankruptcy.
Model 1 conducts the analysis in a sample including rms with CDS and all non-CDS rms. Model 2 only
includes rms with CDS. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's market value of equity. ln(F) is the logarithm of
the book value of the rm's debt, where book debt is the sum of short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt.
1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over
the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. CDS Firm equals one if the rm
has CDS trading at any point in time and zero otherwise. CDS exposure is measured as the logarithm of the
number of live CDS contracts (Number of Live CDS Contracts). The sample period is 1997-2009, based on
monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level.















Number of Live CDS Contracts 0:240 0:539
(0:077) (0:203)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 15:84% 25:53%
N 658966 70038
# of Bankruptcies 940 40
Number of Live CDS Contracts Odds Ratio 1:271 1:714
Number of Live CDS Contracts Marginal Eect 0:03% 0:03%
Sample Probability of a Bankruptcy 0:14% 0:06%
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Table IX
Empty Creditors and the Probability of Bankruptcy
This table investigates the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) on a rm's probability of bankruptcy. ln(E)
is the logarithm of the rm's market value of equity. ln(F) is the logarithm of the book value of the rm's
debt, where book debt is the sum of short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt. 1=E is the inverse of the
rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is
the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. CDS Firm equals one if the rm has CDS trading at any point
in time and zero otherwise. The empty creditor problem is measured as the total notional CDS outstanding,
scaled by the book value of the total debt (CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt). The sample period is
1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and *














CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt 0:071
(0:032)
Time Fixed Eects Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes
Pseudo R2 15:82%
N 658966
# of Bankruptcies 940
CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt Odds Ratio 1:074
CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt Marginal Eect 0:01%
Sample Probability of a Bankruptcy 0:14%
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Table X
Restructuring Clauses of CDS Contracts and Probability of Bankruptcy
This table investigates the impact of the restructuring clauses of credit default swaps (CDS) on the probability
of bankruptcy of rms in a sample including rms with and without CDS traded. The empty creditor problem
is expected to be more signicant for rms with more contracts with \no restructuring" as the restructuring
clause. In Model 1, for each CDS rm, we include a variable for the No Restructuring CDS Proportion,
which is the total amount of active CDS contracts with \no restructuring" as the restructuring clause, scaled
by the total number of CDS contracts trading on it. In Model 2, for each CDS rm, we also calculate the
Modied Restructuring CDS Proportion, which is the total amount of active CDS contracts with \modied
restructuring" as the restructuring clause, scaled by the total number of CDS contracts trading on it. CDS
Firm equals one if the rm has CDS trading at any point in time and zero otherwise. The coecient of
interest is that of No Restructuring CDS Proportion, which captures the impact of the CDS-induced empty
creditor problem. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's market value of equity. ln(F) is the logarithm of the
book value of the rm's debt, where book debt is the sum of short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt.
1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over
the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. The sample period is 1997-2009,
based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at
10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
(1) (2) (3)
ln(E)  0:716  0:717  0:716
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024)
ln(F) 0:715 0:716 0:715
(0:023) (0:023) (0:023)
1/E  1:636  1:645  1:641
(0:132) (0:131) (0:132)
rit 1   rmt 1  1:327  1:327  1:325
(0:111) (0:111) (0:111)
NI/TA  0:037  0:037  0:037
(0:013) (0:013) (0:013)
CDS Firm  0:206  0:163  0:432
(0:195) (0:210) (0:255)
No Restructuring CDS Proportion 1:315 1:557
(0:565) (0:599)
Modied Restructuring CDS Proportion 0:572 0:858
(0:492) (0:528)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 24:06% 24:04% 24:08%
N 658966 658966 658966
# of Bankruptcy 940 940 940
NR CDS Odds Ratio 3:725 4:745
MR CDS Odds Ratio 1:772 2:358
NR CDS Marginal Eect 0:18% 0:22%
MR CDS Marginal Eect 0:01% 0:12%
Sample Probability of a Bankruptcy 0:14% 0:14% 0:14%
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Table XI
CDS Trading, Bank Relationships and Probability of Bankruptcy
This table shows the results of an analysis of the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) on rm-creditor
relationships. The creditor relationships are measured by bank relationships obtained from Dealscan LPC.
For each rm, on a given date, we look back ve years for any syndicated loan facilities extended to this rm.
Summing over all such active facilities, we compute, on each date, the number of unique bank relationships.
M Number of Banks is the change in the number of bank relationships from one year before to two years after
the inception of CDS trading. M ln(Asset) is the change in the logarithm of the rm's total assets value. M
ROA is the change in the rm's return on assets. M Leverage is the change in leverage. M PPENT/Total
Asset is the change in the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. CDS Active is a dummy
variable that equals one after and zero before the inception of CDS trading. ln(E) is the logarithm of the
rm's equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the book value of the rm's debt, where book debt is the sum
of short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility.
rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to
total assets. CDS Firm equals one if the rm has CDS trading at any point in time and zero otherwise.
Number of Banks is the number of existing bank relationships. The coecients of interest are those of CDS
Active and Number of Banks. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at
10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Panel A: CDS and Bank Relationships Panel B: Bank Relationships and Bankruptcy Risk
M Number of Banks Probability of
Bankruptcy
M ln(Asset) 6:291 ln(E)  0:669
(1:849) (0:026)
M ROA  0:396 ln(F) 0:683
(2:76) (0:024)
M Leverage 8:581 1/E  1:763
(5:201) (0:136)
M PPENT/Total Asset  1:586 rit 1   rmt 1  1:339
(10:84) (0:111)
CDS Active 2:432 NI/TA  0:040
(1:069) (0:013)
Time Fixed Eects Yes CDS Firm  2:210
Industry Fixed Eects Yes (0:712)
R2 9:75% CDS Active 2:378
N 496 (0:728)
Number of Banks 0:153
(0:035)
Time Fixed Eects Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes
Pseudo R2 24:32%
N 658966
# of Bankruptcy 940
CDS Active Odds Ratio 10:783
Number of Banks Odds Ratio 1:165








Firm Fixed Eect Regressions for Distance-to-Default and Credit Default Swaps
This table presents estimates of the eect of CDS trading on rms' distance-to-default (DD). DD is cal-
culated from the Merton (1974) model. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is the
logarithm of the rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1
is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total as-
sets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on rms' DD, we include CDS variables in the model
specication. CDS Active is a dummy variable that equals one if the rm has CDS traded on its debt,
one year before month t. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. The re-
gression controls for rm xed eects and time xed eects. (*** Signicant at 1% level,** signi-















Time Fixed Eects Yes





Impact of Credit Default Swaps Trading on Bankruptcy: Alternative Model
This table presents estimates of the eect of CDS trading on rms' bankruptcy risk, based on the model in
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). NIMTAAVG is the weighted average protability ratio of net income
to market-valued total assets, which includes lagged information about protability, as dened in Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). TLMTA is total liabilities over the market value of total assets. EXRETAVG is
the weighted average excess return over the value-weighted S&P 500 return, which includes lagged information
about excess returns. Sigma is the square root of the sum of squared rm stock returns over a 3-month period.
Rsize is the relative size of each rm, measured as the log ratio of its market capitalization to that of the S&P
500 index, and CASHMTA is the stock of cash and short-term investments over the market value of total
assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio of the rm, and PRICE is the rm's log price per share, truncated
above at $15. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on rms' bankruptcy risk, we include CDS variables
in the model specication. CDS Firm equals one if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS
Active is a dummy variable that equals one if the rm has CDS traded on its debt one year before month t.
The sample period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. The regression controls for rm xed eects
and industry xed eects. (*** Signicant at 1% level,** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10%























Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 12:35% 12:77%
N 682053 682053
# of Bankruptcy 888 888
CDS Active Odds Ratio 5:749
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:23%
Sample Probability of Bankruptcy 0:13% 0:13%
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Table A3
Probability of Bankruptcy Controlling for Direct Eect of Downgrade
This table investigates the impact of credit rating and credit default swaps (CDS) trading on the probability of
bankruptcy. The hazard model analysis of the probability of bankruptcy is conducted in a sample including
rms with CDS and non-CDS rms, matched by their propensity score. Propensity score matched rms
are selected based on propensity scores estimated from the model of probability of CDS trading presented
in Table III. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the rm's debt.
1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over
the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. CDS Firm equals one if the
rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS Active is a dummy variable that equals one if the
rm has CDS traded on its debt one year before month t. Unrated equals one if there is no credit rating
on the rm. Downgrade is a dummy variable that equals one if the rm was downgraded one year before
month t. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, **
signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
CDS Prediction Model 1 CDS Prediction Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(E)  1:130  1:141  1:005  1:022
(0:150) (0:149) (0:137) (0:136)
ln(F) 1:143 1:157 0:996 1:017
(0:137) (0:137) (0:123) (0:123)
1/E 0:068 0:084 0:033 0:049
(0:244) (0:234) (0:230) (0:220)
rit 1   rmt 1  2:118  2:140  1:895  1:880
(0:674) (0:671) (0:615) (0:607)
NI/TA 0:054 0:046 0:060 0:052
(0:185) (0:182) (0:164) (0:163)
CDS Firm  0:576  0:981
(0:799) (0:787)
CDS Active 1:656 1:176 2:107 1:264
(0:798) (0:398) (0:810) (0:388)
Unrated 1:309 1:285 1:876 1:855
(0:403) (0:401) (0:368) (0:367)
Downgrade 1:060 1:060 1:155 1:168
(0:442) (0:443) (0:404) (0:406)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 38:91% 38:83% 35:34% 35:12%
N 113886 113886 120494 120494
# of Bankruptcies 45 45 48 48
CDS Active Odds Ratio 5:238 3:241 8:224 3:540
Downgrade Odds Ratio 2:886 2:886 3:174 3:216
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:11% 0:04% 0:08% 0:05%
Downgrade Marginal Eect 0:036% 0:04% 0:04% 0:04%
Sample Probability of Bankruptcy 0:06% 0:04% 0:04% 0:04%
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Table A4
Rating Drift and the Impact of Credit Default Swaps
This table presents the estimates of the probability of bankruptcy using a logistic model in a sample including
rms with credit default swaps (CDS) and non-CDS rms matched by credit rating. The matched rms
selected are the one rm with the same credit rating as the target rm and the closest asset size. ln(E) is the
logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the book value of the rm's debt. 1=E is the
inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year,
and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the
probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy, we include CDS variables in the model specication. CDS Firm
equals one if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS Active is a dummy variable that equals
one if the rm has CDS traded on its debt one year before month t. The coecient of interest is that of CDS
Active, which captures the impact of CDS trading on the probability of bankruptcy after the inception of
CDS trading. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level,















CDS Active 2:431 2:134
(0:667) (0:465)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 39:95% 39:91%
N 141006 141006
# of Bankruptcy 65 65
CDS Odds Ratio 11:370 8:449
CDS Marginal Eect 0:10% 0:09%
Sample Probability
of a Bankruptcy 0:05% 0:05%
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Table A5
Impact of Credit Default Swaps Trading on Credit Quality: Control for
Distance-to-Default
This table presents the estimates of the probability of bankruptcy using a logistic model. The analysis is
conducted in a sample including rms with credit default swaps (CDS) and all non-CDS rms. Besides
the conventional determinants of bankruptcy risk, we also control for rm's distance-to-default (DD). DD is
calculated from the Merton (1974) model. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's market value of equity. ln(F)
is the logarithm of the book value of the rm's debt, where book debt is the sum of short-term debt and 50%
of long-term debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's
excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. To estimate the
impact of CDS trading on the probability of bankruptcy, we include CDS variables in the model specication.
CDS Firm equals one if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS Active is a dummy variable
that equals one after and zero before the inception of CDS trading. The coecient of interest is that of CDS
Active, which captures the impact of CDS trading on the probability of credit downgrades or bankruptcy
after the inception of CDS trading. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (***
Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses
are standard errors.)












CDS Firm 0:862  1:823
(0:057) (0:712)




Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 14:12% 18:66%
N 646923 646923
# of Downgrades(Bankruptcy) 3384 632
CDS Active Odds Ratio 2:056 6:686
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:37% 0:18%
Sample Probability of
a Downgrade(Bankruptcy) 0:52% 0:10%
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Table A6
Impact of Credit Default Swaps Trading on Credit Quality: Distance-to-Default
Matching
This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy using a logistic model
in a sample including rms with credit default swaps (CDS) and non-CDS distance-to-default (DD) matched
rms. Each matched rm selected is the one rm with the closest DD to the target rm. DD is calculated
from the Merton (1974) model. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the
book value of the rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1 rmt 1 is the
rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. To estimate
the impact of CDS trading on the probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy, we include CDS variables in
the model specication. CDS Firm equals one if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS
Active is a dummy variable that equals one if the rm has CDS traded on its debt one year before month t.
The coecient of interest is that of CDS Active, which captures the impact of CDS trading on the probability
of credit downgrades or bankruptcy after the inception of CDS trading. The sample period is 1997-2009,
based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at
10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Distance-to-Default Matching
Probability of Downgrades Probability of Bankruptcy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(E)  0:462  0:447  0:923  0:891
(0:027) (0:028) (0:114) (0:113)
ln(F) 0:318 0:270 0:853 0:865
(0:030) (0:031) (0:116) (0:118)
1/E  0:155  0:008  1:905  1:971
(0:042) (0:038) (0:315) (0:317)
rit 1   rmt 1  0:614  0:09  0:076  0:101
(0:073) (0:056) (0:191) (0:196)
NI/TA  0:845  0:700  0:331  0:994
(0:133) (0:221) (0:221) (0:259)
CDS Firm 1:307  1:809
(0:100) (0:759)
CDS Active 0:586 1:313 2:196 0:773
(0:083) (0:069) (0:759) (0:299)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 12:02% 8:03% 23:16% 23:05%
N 119143 119143 119143 119143
# of Downgrades (Bankruptcy) 1469 1469 67 67
CDS Active Odds Ratio 1:797 3:717 8:989 2:166
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:64% 1:46% 0:12% 0:04%
Sample Probability of
a Downgrade (Bankruptcy) 1:13% 1:14% 0:05% 0:05%
57
Table A7
Credit Rating and CDS Eects
This table investigates the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) trading on the probability of bankruptcy
in subsamples of investment grade and non-investment grade rms. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's
equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the book value of the rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's
annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the
rm's ratio of net income to total assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the probability of credit
downgrades/bankruptcy, we include CDS variables in the model specication. CDS Firm equals one if the
rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS Active is a dummy variable that equals one if the rm
has CDS traded on its debt one year before month t. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on monthly
observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The
numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
Full Sample Investment Grade Non-investment Grade
ln(E)  0:713  0:705  0:704
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024)
ln(F) 0:711 0:702 0:702
(0:023) (0:023) (0:023)
1/E  1:626  1:825  1:625
(0:131) (0:138) (0:134)
rit 1   rmt 1  1:320  1:262  1:323
(0:111) (0:110) (0:112)
NI/TA  0:038  0:036  0:037
(0:013) (0:013) (0:013)
CDS Firm  2:009  1:525  2:182
(0:711) (1:004) (1:002)
CDS Active 2:373 1:893 2:721
(0:729) (1:041) (1:024)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 24:18% 24:09% 23:64%
N 658966 634895 608773
# of Bankruptcies 940 912 924
CDS Active Odds Ratio 10:73 6:64 15:20
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:33% 0:26% 0:40%
Sample Probability of Bankruptcy 0:14% 0:14% 0:15%
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Table A8
Mergers & Acquisitions and the CDS Eect
This table presents the estimates of the probability of bankruptcy using a logistic model in a sample excluding
rms with a Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) event. M&A data are obtained from SDC Interface. ln(E) is the
logarithm of the rm's market value of equity. ln(F) is the logarithm of the book value of the rm's debt,
where book debt is the sum of short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's
annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the
rm's ratio of net income to total assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the probability of credit
downgrades or bankruptcy, we include CDS variables in the model specication. CDS Firm equals one if the
rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS Active is a dummy variable that equals one after and
zero before the inception of CDS trading. The coecient of interest is that of CDS Active, which captures
the impact of CDS trading on the probability of bankruptcy after the inception of CDS trading. The sample
period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level,
















Time Fixed Eects Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes
Pseudo R2 25:20%
N 563771
# of Bankruptcy 839
CDS Active Odds Ratio 7:279
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:30%
Sample Probability
of a Bankruptcy 0:15%
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Table A9
Probability of Credit Default Swaps Trading: Additional Instruments
This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit default swaps (CDS) trading using a probit model.
Propensity scores are estimated based on the model parameters. ln(Asset) is the logarithm of the rm's total
assets value. Leverage is dened as the ratio of book debt to the sum of book debt and market equity, where
book debt is the sum of short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt and market equity is the measure of
the number of common shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price. ROA is the rm's return on assets.
rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year. Equity Volatility is the rm's annualized equity
volatility. PPENT/Total Asset is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. Sales/Total
Asset is the ratio of sales to total assets. EBIT/Total Asset is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax
to total assets. WCAP/Total Asset is the ratio of working capital to total assets. RE/Total Asset is the
ratio of retained earnings to total assets. Cash/Total Asset is the ratio of cash to total assets. CAPX/Total
Asset is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Investment Grade is a dummy variable that equals
one if the rm has an investment grade (BBB- or above) rating. Rated is a dummy variable that equals
one if the rm is rated. Trace Coverage is a dummy that equals one for rms in the Trade Reporting and
Compliance Engine (TRACE) database. Post CFMA is the a dummy that equals one for the period after
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA). The Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated from the
rst-stage probit regression modeling the probability of CDS trading. The sample period is 1997-2009, based
on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10%
level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
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Panel A: Probability of CDS Trading
Probability of CDS Trading
CDS Prediction CDS Prediction











rit 1   rmt 1  0:095  0:099
(0:010) (0:010)
Equity Volatility 0:055 0:068
(0:015) (0:015)
PPENT/Total Asset 0:373 0:357
(0:029) (0:029)
Sales/Total Asset  0:022  0:021
(0:003) (0:003)
EBIT/Total Asset 0:311 0:256
(0:060) (0:060)
WCAP/Total Asset 0:144 0:159
(0:023) (0:024)
RE/Total Asset 0:018 0:023
(0:005) (0:006)
Cash/Total Asset 0:249 0:251
(0:037) (0:037)
CAPX/Total Asset  1:914  1:862
(0:114) (0:115)




Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 38:79% 38:76%
N 690111 690111
#CDS Event 551 551
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Panel B: Treatment Eects Model with Instrumental Variables
Probability of Bankruptcy
CDS Prediction CDS Prediction











CDS Firm  2:271  2:267
(0:710) (0:710)
CDS Active 2:638 2:628
(0:747) (0:745)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0:030 0:035
(0:128) (0:124)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 22:42% 22:42%
N 657438 657438
# of Bankruptcy 940 940
CDS Active Odds Ratio 13:985 13:846
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:37% 0:37%
Sample Probability
of a Bankruptcy 0:14% 0:14%
62
Table A10
Impact of Credit Default Swaps Trading on Credit Quality: CDS Event
This table presents the estimates of the probability of bankruptcy using a logistic model. In contrast to the
baseline results in Table II, we shift the CDS introduction date by one year as a falsication test. ln(E) is
the logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the
rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is
the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations.
(*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in the
















Time Fixed Eects Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes
Pseudo R2 24:20%
N 658966
# of Bankruptcy 940
CDS Active Odds Ratio
CDS Active Marginal Eect 1:79%




Impact of Credit Default Swaps Trading on Bankruptcy: The Feedback Mechanism
This table investigates the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) trading on a rm's probability of bankruptcy,
controlling for rm's CDS spread status. Over Priced (Under Priced) is a dummy that equals one for rms
that are likely to be overpriced (underpriced), as measured by the basis between the CDS and bond yield
spreads. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the rm's debt. 1=E is
the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past
year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on
monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level.
The numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(E)  0:696  0:696  0:696  0:697
(0:030) (0:030) (0:030) (0:030)
ln(F) 0:715 0:714 0:714 0:715
(0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:029)
1/E  1:630  1:628  1:626  1:632
(0:188) (0:188) (0:188) (0:188)
rit 1   rmt 1  1:750  1:747  1:750  1:749
(0:174) (0:174) (0:174) (0:174)
NI/TA  0:042  0:042  0:042  0:042
(0:018) (0:018) (0:018) (0:018)
CDS Firm  1:578  1:532  1:498  1:497
(1:005) (1:005) (1:005) (1:005)
CDS Active 1:982 2:066 1:932 1:932
(1:021) (1:017) (1:021) (1:021)
CDS Active*Over Priced 7:804 9:851
(211:54) (573:80)
Over Priced  7:205  9:284
(211:54) (573:80)
CDS Active*Under Priced  1:946  1:833
(613:85) (616:39)






Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 27:54% 27:54% 27:56% 27:53%
N 398638 398638 398638 398638
# of Bankruptcies 530 530 530 530
CDS Active Odds Ratio 7:257 7:893 6:903 6:903
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:25% 0:26% 0:25% 0:25%
Sample Probability
of Bankruptcy 0:13% 0:13% 0:13% 0:13%
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Table A12
Impact of Credit Default Swaps Trading on Bankruptcy: Analyst Coverage
This table investigates the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) trading on a rm's probability of bankruptcy
in a sample including rms with high (low) analyst coverage. Analyst coverage has been used as a proxy for
the availability of private information. High (low) analyst coverage is indicated by the number of analysts
of a rm being above (below) the median in the sample. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's equity value.
ln(F) is the logarithm of the rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility.
rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to
total assets. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level,
** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
Low Analyst Coverage High Analyst Coverage Full Sample
ln(E)  0:596  0:713  0:712
(0:032) (0:024) (0:024)
ln(F) 0:584 0:711 0:710
(0:032) (0:023) (0:023)
1/E  1:773  1:626  1:660
(0:209) (0:131) (0:133)
rit 1   rmt 1  1:286  1:320  1:319
(0:156) (0:111) (0:111)
NI/TA  0:026  0:038  0:039
(0:017) (0:013) (0:013)
CDS Firm  1:537  2:009  2:021
(1:006) (0:711) (0:711)
CDS Active 1:986 2:373 2:329
(1:044) (0:729) (0:737)




Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 20:12% 28:71% 24:21%
N 256404 402562 658966
# of Bankruptcies 450 490 940
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:34% 0:32% 0:32%
Sample Probability of Bankruptcy 0:18% 0:12% 0:14%
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